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Abstract 
In order to exploit the renewable energy (RE) and climate mitigation potential, transaction costs 
(TCs) of implementing RE technologies need to be better understood and eventually scaled down. 
The objective of this thesis is to identify and analyze the nature of TCs borne by obliged parties 
under the recent “Feed-in Tariff” (FIT) scheme in the United Kingdom. In addition, the findings 
are compared with ones from the existing literature in order to examine their consistency and to 
explain potential divergencies.Taking as a case the small-scale solar PV projects, a number of 
sources of TCs were identified in the different phases of the life-cycle of the scheme including: i) 
planning, ii) implementation and iii) monitoring and verification phase. Results show that the most 
significant souces of TCs costs occur in the implementation and monitoring phases and are related 
to baseline development, administration and certification and monitoring activities. The actors 
who endure them are the obliged FIT energy suppliers and the authorities.The analysis also reveals 
that findings are generally consistent with other studies in the field. However, negotiations were 
not identified as a major source of TCs as in most of other cases. Standardization of the data 
collection process and of monitoring activities is suggested as a strategy that could front and 
potentially reduce TCs. Finally, it is concluded that several endogenous and/or exogenous factors 
determine the nature of TCs even under FIT schemes and consequently a further analysis which 
would include an estimation of their scale seem to be necessary. 
 
Keywords: Renewable energy; solar PV; feed-in tariffs; transaction costs 
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Executive Summary 
It is generally argued that one way to tackle the consequences of climate change and to enhance a 
sustainable energy future is the implementation of cleaner energy solutions (IPCC, 2011). In 
specific, a transition to more sustainable energy supply systems and the mitigation of climate 
change can be achieved through the deployment of renewable energy sources (RES). At the same 
time, it is strongly considered that RES can provide several opportunities for a more sustainable 
economic development; can facilitate the access to energy and contribute to energy security (ibid). 
In simply words, it is becoming clear that RES will play a key role in the near future since they 
appear to be one of the most efficient and effective solutions for the achievement of sustainable 
development (Dincer, 2000). 
 
In order RES to achieve the abovementioned objectives it is more than necessary to be driven by 
an effective policy or combination of policies (Mendonça, 2007). Specifically, renewable energy 
policies are essential for the improvement and maturity of RE technologies (RETs) and can help 
them to compete with other energy sources (like fossil or nuclear) in the market. In relation to 
electricity generation, one of the most widely used policy instruments for the diffusion of RETs is 
the Feed-in Tariff (FIT) scheme. In European countries like Denmark, Germany and Spain, FITS 
have been applying successfully and drove to a significant increase of RES electricity plants (Klein 
et al., 2010). In addition, various studies have concluded that FIT schemes are effective and 
efficient for deploying RE electricity since they provide long-term fixed prices and guarantee the 
purchase of all the electricity produced (IEA, 2008; IPCC, 2012; Klein et al., 2008; Ernst and 
Young, 2008).  
 
However, even though the opportunities related to the introduction of RE seem to be great, there 
are also barriers and issues that slow the RE deployment into modern economies (Arvizu et al., 
2011). One of the key barriers for the development of RET and policy instruments promoting RE 
deployment are Transaction Costs (TCs) (Mitchell et al., 2011). TCs can reduce the performance 
of RE policy instruments in terms of cost-effectiveness and environmental effectiveness according 
to Mitchell et al. (2011) and Stavins (1995). The possibilities of biases in policy designs and choices 
may increase in cases where TCs are not taking into account, while the validity of policy 
evaluations may decline (McCann et al., 2005; Mundaca et al., 2013). 
 
To date, our knowledge about TCs is fragmented across different disciplines while there is not a 
comprehensive and complete analysis of TCs related to RE policies (Mundaca et al., 2013). As 
regards FITs, the number of ex post evaluations that identify and analyze the origin and scale of 
potential TCs is limited even thought there might be some areas of complexities in such schemes. 
Therefore, it is obvious that there is need for further research about the nature and measurement 
of TCs (Macher & Richman, 2008; McCann et al., 2005). 
 
By using the recently implemented FIT scheme in the United Kingdom (UK) and the solar 
photovoltaic (PV) technology as a case study, the aim of this research is to improve our knowledge 
about the TCs associated with FITs. The UK FIT scheme was selected for two reasons. The first 
one is related to the fact that there is little research regarding its performance since the scheme was 
recently introduced. The second one has to do with the fact that the design of the UK FIT is 
different and more complex from others in Europe. Moreover, the solar PV technology is selected 
since it is most deployed as a result of the FIT programme. The main objective of this thesis is to 
identify the potential sources of TCs resulting during the different life cycle phases of the UK FIT 
programme and borne by the obliged parties and the authorities. Based on the available results, the 
study attempts to examine how these TCs affect the performance of the particular scheme. While 
by comparing the identified sources of TCs with results of similar studies, potential gaps or 
divergencies are recognized and explained.   
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For this study data was collected through a variety of sources and methods in order to adequately 
and objectively address the research questions. Background knowledge about transaction costs and 
their analysis was collected through literature review of peer-reviewed journal articles, related case 
studies and books. Whilst, key stakeholders involved were interviewed in order to get insights that 
could not be obtained by the literature. Supplementary, short interviews with experts in the field of 
RET policy instruments were conducted in order to confront the findings of the analysis part.  
 
For the data analysis the theoretical basis used was transaction cost analysis (TCA), while an 
analytical framework developed by L. Mundaca (2007; 2013), which has been tested already twice, 
was selected in order to identify the sources of TCs throughout the scheme. In particular, based 
on this life cycle approach, TCs of a scheme can be identified and assessed during three main 
phases including: a) planning, b) implementation and c) monitoring and verification. In addition, in 
order to facilitate the identification of potential sources of TCs within the different phases of the 
scheme a categorization of them was used. According to the taxonomy, there are five main 
categories of costs: a) due diligence (search for and assessment of information), b) negotiation 
costs, c) approval and certification costs, d) monitoring and verification (M&V) costs and e) 
trading costs. Furthermore, the results of the analysis were compared with findings from similar 
studies in the field of RETs. Purpose of this comparison was to acknowledge similarities and 
divergencies between similar studies. After that the data of the UK FIT case were exposed to 
experts by asking them to confirm the results and express their views on the subject. 
 
The analysis reveals that souces of TCs costs occur in all the phases of the scheme, including the 
planning, the implementation and monitoring. Moreover, TCs are related to baseline development, 
administration and certification and monitoring activities while; the actors who endure them are 
the RE generators, the obliged FIT energy suppliers and the authorities such as the Office of gas 
and electricity markets (Ofgem) and the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). The 
comparison between the UK FIT findings and those from similar studies in the field shows that 
there are a number of similarities regarding the nature of the identified TCs. Nevertheless, in the 
case of the UK FIT scheme negotiation activities are not identified as a major source of TCs as in 
the other studies. Furthermore, in contrast to other studies, RE generators do not bear high level 
of TCs under the UK FIT scheme. Experts point out that the most significant TCs occur in the 
implementation and monitoring phases, while approval and certification costs as well as 
monitoring costs constitute the most significant sources of TCs. These TCs are borne mainly by 
the FIT licensees and Ofgem. Furthermore, some of them suggest that the preparation and design 
of the scheme should be considered as significant sources of TCs too. Strategies like 
standardization of the data collection process and of monitoring activities are suggested as ways 
that could front and potentially reduce TCs. However, the nature and the significance of TCs are 
very likely to differ even under FIT schemes because of a number of endogenous and/or 
exogenous factors. Therefore it is concluded that no valid generalizations can be made about FIT 
schemes and that further research remains to be done including a quantitive estimation of TCs 
under the particular scheme. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Research 
Climate change is now recognized as one of the most important environmental problems 
worldwide, negative effects of which are not only relevant in the distant future, but already 
occuring, affecting billions of people and the whole ecosystem around the globe (OECD, 2011). 
Global warming, increase in ocean temperatures and ocean acidity as well as increased intensity 
and frequency of extreme weather events, are recognized as the main components of the ongoing 
climate change (UNFCCC, 2007). According to the latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change of United Nations (IPCC, 2011), global warming is “unequivocal”. Moreover, 
in the report is expressed a high degree of certainty (over 90%) that anthropogenic activities 
associated with the release of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are responsible for the climate 
change. Even more alarming is the fact there are detailed projections which show that global 
warming will not only continue but will accelerate in the coming decades (IPCC 2007; UNFCCC, 
2007).  
 
Production and consumption of fossil fuel-based energy sources such as coal, oil and natural gas 
have proven to be the main contributors of today’s high GHG emission levels. Carbon dioxide 
(CO2) consists one of the main greenhouse gases with a share almost 77% in global emissions in 
2004 (IEA, 2012). While, more than half of these emissions were caused by the use of fossil fuels 
(UNFCCC, 2009). In particular, by the end of 2010 CO2 emissions were almost 40% higher 
compared to preindustrial levels (IPCC, 2011). Indisputably, it is impossible to keep atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations at acceptable levels if our economies continue to depend mainly on 
conventional energy sources (Herzog et al., 2001). At the same time, the availability of these 
conventional energy sources diminishes since the reserves of fossil-fuels are limited and 
nonrenewable (Meadows et al., 2004). 
 
According to the Global Energy Assessment (GEA 2012), developed countries need to reduce 
their GHG emissions by 60%- 80% below 1990-levels in order to achieve the 50% reduction in 
global emissions by the year 2050. It is generally argued that one way to tackle the consequences of 
climate change and to enhance a sustainable energy future is the implementation of cleaner energy 
solutions (IPCC, 2011). In specific, a transition to more sustainable energy supply systems and the 
mitigation of climate change can be achieved through the deployment of renewable energy sources 
(RES) (IPCC, 2011). RES are non-fossil energy sources such as wind, solar, geothermal, hydro, 
wave and tidal power as well as biomass and biogas (EU Directive 2001/77/EC). One of the main 
advantages of RE technologies is their low CO2 emissions into the atmosphere compared with 
those from fossil fuels (IPCC, 2011). In addition, it is argued that RES can meet many times the 
world’s energy demand since their theoretical potential is massive (ibid). According to the Special 
Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation of IPCC (2011), “RE may 
provide a number of opportunities and can not only address climate change mitigation but may 
also address sustainable and equitable economic development, energy access, secure energy supply 
and local environmental and health impacts”. Therefore, it is becoming clear that RES will play a 
key role in the near future since they appear to be one of the most efficient and effective solutions 
for the achievement of sustainable development (Dincer, 2000). 
 
In order RE to achieve the objectives mentioned before it is more than necessary to be driven by 
an effective policy or combination of policies (Mendonça, 2007). Specifically, renewable energy 
policies are essential for the improvement and maturity of RE technologies (RETs) and can help 
them to compete with other energy sources (like fossil or nuclear) in the market (Dijk et al., 2003). 
Today, there is a wide range of policy instruments that can be implemented for the promotion of 
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RE in the energy systems (Langniss, 2003). Being one of the main contributors of the global GHG 
emissions, Europe in 2007 decided to adopt a new integrated plan called “the 20-20-20 targets” 
and committed to become a low-carbon economy. One of the main targets was to obtain 20% of 
the total EU energy consumption from renewable resources by 20201 (Europe 2020). In order to 
achieve this target, all the member countries had to develop national renewable energy action plans 
according to the EU RES Directive 2009/28/EC (Klein et al., 2010). In simply terms, all the EU 
member states introduced a number of policy instruments in order to encourage the deployment 
of RETs and favor the production of energy by renewable sources.  
 
As regards the promotion of electricity production from RES, most countries of Europe have 
implemented Market-based instruments (MBI) in combination with “Command and Control” 
regulatory instruments (i.e. restrictions, penalties, fees etc.). MBI are also known as economic 
instruments or price-based instruments and receive increased attention in a number of countries 
the recent years (Huber et al., 1999). MBI are broadly defined as “regulations that encourage 
behavior through market signals rather than through explicit directives” in order to achieve 
specific environmental targets (ibid; Stavins, 2001). 
 
As mentioned before, the opportunities related to the introduction of RE seem to be great 
however there are also barriers and issues that slow the RE deployment into modern economies 
(Arvizu et al., 2011). According to the latest IPCC report on RE, the major barriers for RE 
development and implementation can be categorized as market failures and economic, information 
and awareness, socio-cultural and institutional or policy ones (Moomaw et al., 2011). Specifically, 
market failures in the case of RE deployment result because environmental impacts and risks of 
conventional energy use are not fully internalized in the total costs (ibid). For instance, the 
negative impacts resulting from fossil fuel combustion are not included into the price of the 
electricity that they produce. In addition, due to immaturity of some RET, high RE system capital 
costs and uncertainty in future electricity prices some financial risks and economic barriers may 
appear for the potential investors. The fact that there is limited public and institutional awareness 
about the technical and economic issues of implementating RE projects is also considered a 
barrier (ibid). Frequently, the costs associated with the shifting from fossil fuels to RE sources are 
overestimated and this hinders the development of RE projects. Moreover, the fact that in many 
cases the knowledge or experience of RE policies is not the appropriate one constitutes an 
obstruction to the RE goal. Existing socio-cultural norms may also slow down the perception and 
acceptance of RE from the public (Arvizu et al., 2011). Besides this, there are institutional and 
policy barriers since the current energy market regulations are designed based on monopoly 
powers and promote large and centralized energy systems (ibid). Finally, the report addresses 
Transaction costs (TCs) as one of the key barriers for the development of RET and policy 
instruments promoting RE deployment (Mitchell et al., 2011). Even though RE projects are 
typically smaller compared to conventional fossil or nuclear projects, the TCs are unequally higher. 
Feasibility pre-studies and due diligence work is necessary for every investment, however the costs 
of these actions do not vary considerably with project size. Consequently, pre-investment costs 
like legal or engineering costs, consultants hiring etc. do have a proportionately bigger effect on 
the TCs related to RE projects. Due to lack of or insufficient information in RE markets, the RET 
project risks tend to be overrated while TCs can be higher than those related with fossil fuel 
technologies (ibid). Overall, is important to stress the fact that usually most of the barriers 
mentioned above are interrelated and hence, it is difficult to pick out only one of them for any RE 
project case.  
                                                 
1 The other two aims of the EU “20-20-20” initiative are the reduction of GHG emissions by 20% and the improvement of energy 
efficiency by 20% by the year 2020. 
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1.2 Problem Definition 
In general, the economic theory indicates the importance of TCs and the fact that they inhibit 
efficient exchanges in the markets (Dudek & Wiener, 1996). Specifically, as mentioned in the latest 
IPCC Special Report on RE (2011), one of the key deterrents for the development of RE projects 
is the existence of TCs. While according to Lof (2009) and Miller (2008), small scale low carbon 
technologies like RET are usually exposed to high TCs.  
 
In relation to power generation, various studies have concluded that Feed-in Tariff (FIT) schemes 
are effective and efficient for deploying RE electricity since they provide long-term fixed prices, 
guarantee the purchase of all the electricity produced and are simpler than other RE policies (Dijk 
et al., 2003; IEA, 2008; IPCC, 2011; Klein et al., 2008). A FIT scheme can be defined as an 
economic instrument used to promote investments in small-scale RE projects by offering long-
term purchase agreements for the sale of RE electricity (Cory et al., 2009). The major objective of 
this policy instrument is to generate an attractive and stable investment environment, in order to 
form markets, reduce costs, promote technological innovation and therefore to help each country 
to gradually transform into a low emission economy (Mendonça, 2011). According to IPCC 
(2011), the role of fiscal incentive policies like FITs are really significant for the spread of 
decentralized production of RE and the deployment of RETs since they create an “enabling 
environment”. In the same report is mentioned that even though the FIT scheme is considered an 
effective renewable energy policy it might sometimes be necessary to be combined with other 
policies to be more effective and efficient (IPCC, 2011). More details about FITs and their design 
are presented in Section 3.1. 
 
For Europe FIT schemes have been considered to be the main contributor to the success of RE 
markets in Germany, Denmark and Spain (Cory et al., 2009; Dijk et al., 2003; Klein et al., 2010). In 
addition, in 2009 the Department of Energy and Climate Change of UK realized that increasing 
the use of renewable energy will enable the country to recover some of its energy self-sufficiency 
and will create many economic and employment opportunities. As a result, a target that 1.6% of 
the UK electricity consumption will be delivered from small-scale RES by 2020 was set and the 
use of FITs for this purpose was decided (DECC, 2010; Walker 2012). Furthermore, the reviewed 
literature underlines that there is a number of ex ante and ex post evaluation studies that assess the 
performance of FIT schemes and the new markets that they create. The importance of such 
studies is high since they can reflect potential opportunities and challenges of FIT schemes and 
contribute to their improvement. According to Dudek and Wiener (1996), TCs are usually an 
afterthought to market transactions while in the case of environmental policies they are very rarely 
considered. Until today most evaluation studies do not analyze in detail the TCs for FIT schemes 
(Mundaca et al., 2013). Notably, it is argued that the majority of FIT assessments do not take into 
account the existence of potential transaction costs due to their simplicity compared to other 
renewable energy policies (ibid). Example consist the case of the UK FIT scheme where a 
comprehensive review was carried out after the first year of its introduction in 2011 without 
addressing TCs at all (DECC, 2011). In other words, such evaluations often assume that there are 
no costs (other than investment and direct project costs) during the implementation of renewable 
energy technologies and consequently their effects on FIT and its policy performance are not 
addressed (IPCC, 2007). As a consequence, the results of such assessments may undervalue the 
total costs associated with the particular policy instrument and deliver a misleading result. 
Therefore, in order to improve the evaluation of RE policies studies that provide a consistent 
analysis of the nature and scale of TCs is more than necessary (Mundaca et al., 2013). 
 
According to empirical studies, the existence of TCs can have a negative impact on the 
performance of energy policies (Dudek & Wiener, 1996). In this way, TCs can reduce not only the 
economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness of a policy instrument but also its environmental 
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effectiveness (Mitchell et al., 2011; Mundaca et al., 2013; Stavins, 1995). According to Kesicki and 
Strachan (2011) and Worrell et al. (2004) TCs should be estimated in order to determine if 
particular GHG emission reductions are cost-effective or not. At the same time, OECD (2002) 
proposes that further research must be undertaken regarding the different forms of TCs since their 
impacts are unknown. To date, our knowledge about TCs is fragmented across different 
disciplines while there is not a comprehensive and complete analysis of TCs related to RE policies 
(Mundaca et al., 2013). Additionally, there is limited literature on the quantification of TCs 
associated with policies that promote RE technologies (GEA, 2012; IPCC, 2007). In particular, a 
study in which the nature and scale of TCs of RE were addressed was the one of Skytte et al. 
(2003) in which the challenges for renewable electricity investments in the EU market were 
presented. The authors of this study tried to identify the nature of TCs related to planning, 
implementation and production phases of a RE project. In addition, Battjes et al. (2000) identified 
the sources of TCs under the Tradable Green Certificate scheme in the Netherlands and tried to 
estimate their scale. Finon and Perez (2007) also addressed TCs of RET by comparing and 
assessing Renewable Energy Sources in Electricity (RES-E) price- and quantity- policy instruments 
from a TC perspective.  
 
In the case of FITs, the number of ex post evaluations that identify and analyze the origin and 
scale of potential TCs is also limited even thought there might be some areas of complexities in 
such schemes. Specifically, during the literature review only one study on TCs about FITs was 
identified which was conducted by Ole Langniss in 2003. An explanation to this might be the fact 
that TCs are widely thought to be low for FITs compared to other RE policies. In his study, 
Langniss (2003) identified the nature and estimated the scale of TCs related to the FIT scheme in 
Germany and compared them with those of the Renewable Portofolio Standard (RPS) in Texas. 
Nevertheless, he examined only the TCs associated with the activities during the implementation 
of the schemes and only from the perspective of the energy suppliers. 
 
Consequently, it becomes clear that there are knowledge gaps regarding the nature and estimation 
of TCs related to RE policy instruments which are necessary to fill in (Macher & Richman, 2008; 
McCann et al., 2005; Mundaca et al., 2013). Moreover, in order to exploit the renewable energy 
potential, TCs of implementing RETs and concepts like FITs need to be better understood and 
eventually reduced. 
1.3 Research Objective and Question 
The present thesis constitutes a response to the scholars’ calls regarding more research on TCs and 
their effects on RE policies like FITs (Macher & Richman, 2008; McCann et al., 2005; Mundaca et 
al., 2013). By using the United Kingdom (UK) as a case (details in Section 3), the aim of this 
research is to improve our knowledge about the TCs associated with FITs. Therefore, the main 
objective of this thesis is to identify the potential sources of TCs resulting during the different life 
cycle phases of the FIT programme and borne by the obliged parties and the authorities in the 
UK. Based on the available results, the study attempts to examine how these TCs affect the 
performance of the particular scheme. While by comparing the identified sources of TCs with 
results of similar studies, potential gaps or divergencies are recognized and explained. To this end, 
the following research questions are designed in order to guide the research. 
1. What are the main sources of TCs of the FIT scheme in the UK? In which phases of the 
scheme’s “life-cycle” most of these costs do occur and which actors bear them? 
2. How do these TCs affect the development and implementation of RETs and thus the 
performance of the FIT scheme in the UK? 
3. How do the identified sources of TCs compared to the ones from the existing literature? Is 
there consistency? What can explain the gaps or divergencies? 
15 
By accomplishing the abovementioned objectives, this study aims to contribute with knowledge 
that can potentially be used by policy makers to reduce TCs and improve the performance of the 
scheme. 
1.4 Scope and Limitations 
In order to explore TCs and provide empirical evidence of the nature of TCs, case study 
methodology was applied in this study. From the geographical point of view, the analysis focuses on 
the FIT scheme in the UK. The scheme was introduced just in 2010 in order to support the 
deployment of small-scale renewable. Until 2010, the major renewable support scheme of UK was 
the Renewable Obligation (RO). As a result, there is little research regarding the performance of 
the FIT programme in UK. In addition, the UK-style FIT is different from others in Europe. For 
instance, the tariffs are split into generation and export ones while in the German system there is 
only the generation tariff. Taking into consideration the abovementioned, it seemed that the UK is 
an interesting case study for exploring FITs in regards to TCs. 
 
From the technological point of view, the thesis focuses on the case of solar photovoltaics (PV). The 
RET covered by the UK FIT scheme are five in total (solar PV up to a maximum total installed 
capacity of 5MW, wind up to 5MW, hydro up to 5MW, anaerobic digestion up to 5MW and micro 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) up to 2kW (DECC, 2012). However, according to FIT 
Installations Statistical Reports published by the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) 
solar PVs seem to have by far the highest installation levels since the FIT programme was 
introduced. In other words, it can be argued that the UK FIT has primarily incentivized the small-
scale solar PV projects so far. Therefore, the scope of this study is narrowed to the technology 
that is most deployed as a result of the FIT, the solar PVs. 
1.5 Targeted Audience 
This thesis is targeted towards energy researchers, policy-makers, RE companies and suppliers, RE 
associations, consultants and any other stakeholders that are directly involved or interested in the 
UK FIT scheme. In addition, the targeted audience of this paper includes the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) of UK and the Ofgem since the focus is on the UK FIT 
scheme. In general, the thesis is addressed to anyone who is interested in RE policies and TCs. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows.  
 
Chapter 2 provides the analytical framework used within the research. In particular, is provided 
information regarding the New Institutional Economics and the Transaction Cost Analysis while 
the methods of data collection and analysis are presented. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the case of the UK FIT scheme. In specific, the background of the policy is 
presented as well as its design and implementation. A brief description of the scheme’s early 
performance is also provided. 
 
Chapter 4 highlights the research findings. The nature of TCs during the different phases of the 
FIT’s life-cycle is presented. In addition, a comparison and critical review between the sources of 
TCs found within the UK FIT scheme and the ones identified by similar studies is provided. 
Expert views on the subject are also confronting the results of the analysis. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 5 conclusions are drawn while suggestions for future research are given. 
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2 Analytical Framework and Methodology 
2.1 New Institutional Economics and Transaction Cost Analysis 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) is described as “a new school of thought” that attempts 
to incorporate a theory of institutions into economics (North, 1990). Albeit often attributed to 
Coase - and his article “The Nature of the Firm” (1937), institutional economics were initiated by 
John R. Commons and the German Historical School (Thorstein Veblen). Commons (1934) 
established the transaction as being the basic unit of analysis to study economic organisation, 
which led to the development of the TCs analysis and became the main focus of the NIE School 
of economics. Other leading representatives of NIE are Douglass North (1990) and Oliver 
Williamson (1975) who introduced the term of NIE in 1975. The NIE focuses on how decisions 
and transactions made by market agents are frequently based on imperfect information, and also 
on how institutional frameworks influence the behaviour of these agents (Ménard, 2004). The role 
of institutions in regulating exchanges is central to both Williamson (1981) and North (1990) 
approaches to TC analysis, but at different levels. Williamson (1979) considers that the role of 
institutions and their arrangement is to minimise TCs, while North (1990) points out the existence 
of inefficient institutions. 
The primary language of NIE is economics; however, it is an interdisciplinary movement that 
combines sciences such as political science, law, sociology and anthropology in order to better 
understand institutions and their impacts over time (Klein 1999; North 1993; Richter 2005). It is 
commonly said that NIE strives to broaden the spectrum of neoclassical theory rather than to 
replace it (Furobotn & Richter, 1991; Ménard & Shirley, 2005; Rutherford, 2001).  
One of the fundamental elements of the NIE paradigm2 is transaction cost analysis (TCA) which 
examines activities in the economic system, such as how they are formulated and executed, and 
their impacts on the performance of the projects and/or actors involved through transactions with 
involved market agents (Commons, 1931). The indicated transactions are frequently based on 
imperfect and asymmetric information, bounded rationality and lack of monitoring (Ménard, 2004; 
Mundaca et al., 2013; North 1990; Selten, 1990). According to Langniss (2003), by introducing 
TCA the scholars of the NIE seek to address problems related to incomplete information. In 
addition, transaction cost economics which constitutes the academic base of TCA focuses on the 
sources and the scale of TCs in order to identify policies to limit the existence of TCs and their 
magnitude (Mundaca & Neij, 2006). 
A significant theoretical challenge in TCA is the fact that studies need to look at different 
constractual aspects of transactions (Ménard, 2004; Williamson, 1979). In specific, Coase (1937) 
limits his focus only on ‘pre-contractual’ activities such as search for information and inspection, 
while Williamson (1979) underlines the significance of post-contractual activities (e.g. operation, 
control and enforcement). On the other hand, Matthews (1986) and Furubotn and Richter (2010) 
have a more inclusive perspective since they take into account both of the abovementioned 
activities as well as the drafting of the contract (Mundaca et al., 2013). In addition, there are also 
different perspectives on how TCs are defined. The most general definition of TCs is the one of 
Arrow (1969). According to the economist, TCs are defined as “the running costs of an economic 
system”. A more precise definition is given from Ostertag (1999) who states that TCs are 
                                                 
2Since 1970s, the NIE include the following core fields: Transaction cost economics, Property right economics, 
Economic contract theory and New institutional approach to history (Richter, 2005). 
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unmeasured, hidden costs not directly involved in the production of goods or services. According 
to Ostertag (1999), potential source of TCs could be considered the time devoted to identify a 
particular product on the market. Nevertheless, he argues that activities such as monitoring and 
maintenance should be considered production costs of a low carbon technology (LCT) and not a 
potential source of TCs. On the other hand, Matthews (1986) gives a different definition. He 
defines TCs as “…the costs of arranging a contract ex ante and monitoring and enforcing it ex post, 
as opposed to production cost”. Based on this definition, Mundaca (2007) thinks that TCs can be 
defined as a subgroup of hidden costs and not as part of the actual investment and administrative 
costs. Langniss (2003) encloses costs derived from activities related to implementation of a RE 
mechanism into his definition of TCs. Other authors, such as Skytte et al. (2003) define TCs as 
costs occurring during the planning, implementation and monitoring phases of a project. 
Moreover, Skytte et al. (2003) define the TCs that emerge during the implementation phase as 
opportunity costs (e.g. lost time and resources). In the definition of TCs provided by reports on 
the Kyoto Protocol, pre-implementation, implementation and production phases of a RE project 
are included (Del Río, 2007; Michaelowa et al., 2003). 
2.2 Transaction Costs and Renewable Energy Technologies 
At the same time based on the different conceptual definitions of TCs mentioned above, 
evaluation studies that focus on TCs associated with LCTs like RETs carried out. Each of these 
studies examines the sources and /or the level of TCs under a specific RET scheme. For instance, 
in their study Skytte et al. (2003) examined the sources of TCs and tried to estimate their level 
under the RE investments in the EU market. Particularly, as sources of TCs were identified search 
and pre-feasibility studies, negotiation costs, approval and administrative costs as well as 
monitoring, enforcement and adjustment costs. Langniss (2003) identified the nature and tried to 
estimate the scale of direct TCs related to the FIT scheme in Germany and the Renewable 
Portofolio Standard in Texas and focused mainly on the perspective of the RE generators and the 
obligated purchasers. Activities like search for information, negotiations, application for 
certificates, calculation of obligated amounts, metering, auditing and reporting were some of the 
identified sources of TCs. Indirect TCs or governance costs were not included into his study. In 
addition, Finon and Perez (2007) addressed the sources of TCs related to RETs by comparing 
price- (like FITs) and quantity- (like  RES-E quotas) policy instruments from a TCE perspective. 
Battjes et al. (2000) studied the case of the Tradable Green Certificate scheme in the Netherlands 
and provided estimates of their scale. In this case, TCs were identified as costs undertaken by 
obligated actors in addition to costs of meeting the obligation itself. Moreover, Kåberger et al. 
(2004) identified TCs related to administrative activities under the Tradable Green Certificate 
scheme in Sweden. Another study in which TCs related to RETs were addressed is the one carried 
by Ram and Selvaraj (2012). In the study TCs were referred as one of the key barriers to the 
development of RE projects n India. Finally, Nagaoka (2002) examined the case of sugar canes for 
electricity production in Brazil and found out that a main source of TCs was contract negotiation 
costs. All the above studies and their results regarding the sources of TCs are used to compare the 
findings of the UK FIT scheme in Section 4.2. 
 
As regards the methods of data collection (Section 2.3) in the case of the UK FIT scheme, they 
were based on the theoretical basis of TCA as mentioned in the NIE. The selection of the 
methods for data analysis (Section 2.4) was based on the definition of TCs given by Matthews 
(1986) and Furubotn and Richter (2010). The particular definition can be described more holistic 
compared to other definitions of TCs since it includes ex-ante (i.e planning, preparation), 
implementation and ex-post costs (i.e monitoring, verification) related to a project. For that reason 
appeared to be the most appropriate definition in the case of the UK FIT scheme. More details 
regarding the employed methods of data collection and analysis are provided in the following 
subsections. 
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2.3 Methods for Data Collection 
For this study data was collected through a variety of sources and methods in order to adequately 
and objectively address the research questions. Background knowledge about transaction costs and 
their analysis was collected through literature review of peer- reviewed journal articles, related case 
studies and books.  
 
Literature analysis was also used for data collection regarding the UK FIT scheme. In specific, 
information about its design and implementation as well as its performance was retrieved from 
primary government documents and official reports. The UK Government makes many of its past 
and recent documents available at its ofgem.gov.uk website.  
 
In addition, key stakeholders involved in the UK FIT scheme were interviewed in order to get 
insights that could not be obtained by the literature. This included the Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets (OFGEM), Energy Network Association (ENA), Northern Powergrid 
Holdings Company and involved energy academic researchers (see list of interviewees after 
bibliography). The interviews were semi-structured and conducted by phone or through Skype. In 
cases of time constraints the interviewees corresponded to the questions through email. Main 
objectives of these interviews were to get a better overview of the FIT scheme and to identify the 
potential sources of TCs. Supplementary, short interviews with three experts in the field of RET 
policy instruments were conducted in order to ask their opinion about the identified sources of 
TCs under the UK FIT scheme and to confront the findings of the analysis part (see interview 
protocol in Annex A). 
2.4 Methods for Data Analysis 
In general terms, the theoretical basis used for the analysis of the data collected was transaction 
cost analysis (TCA). However, because of conceptual differences regarding TCs there is no clear 
method in order to identify sources of TCs. Therefore, an analytical framework developed by L. 
Mundaca (2007; 2013), which has been tested already twice, was selected in order to identify the 
sources of TCs under the FIT scheme in the UK. This analytical framework was developed for the 
analysis of TCs under the Tradable White Certificate schemes (TWC) and applied for the case of 
Energy Efficiency Commitment in Great Britain. The analytical framework is based on the life 
cycle approach of any programme that promotes LCTs. In particular, according to a life cycle 
approach TCs of a scheme can be identified and assessed through its main phases which (most of 
the times) are the following: a) planning, b) implementation, c) monitoring and verification and d) 
trading. Taking into consideration that the FIT scheme is a policy instrument that promotes the 
diffusion of LCTs, the selection of this particular analytical approach seemed to be a suitable one. 
Of course the phases of the life cycle model had to be modified since the FIT scheme differs from 
other energy policy instruments that promote LCTs. In particular, the trading phase excluded since 
activities related to trade do not take place during the UK FIT scheme. In Figure 2-1 are presented 
the phases based on which the analysis of TCs related to the UK FIT scheme was conducted. 
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Figure 2-1 Life cycle of FIT Scheme 
Source: Based on the framewotk of Mundaca et al. (2013) 
Additionally, in order to facilitate the identification of potential sources of TCs within the different 
phases of the scheme a categorization of TCs seemed to be necessary. As mentioned before, for 
the case of FITs in UK was decided to be employed the most inclusive definition of TCs given by 
Matthews (1986). Therefore, the selected taxonomy of TCs should be built on the approach of 
Matthews. The taxonomy being selected was the one developed by Mundaca, Mansoz, Neij and 
Timilsina (2013). The particular taxonomy of TCs was not only developed based on the 
conceptual approach of Matthews (1986) but also is applicable for policies that promote LCTs 
including RETs. According to the taxonomy, there are five main categories of costs: a) due 
diligence (search for and assessment of information), b) negotiation costs, c) approval and 
certification costs, d) monitoring and verification (M&V) costs and e) trading costs (see Table 2-1). 
At this point, it is necessary to mention that the type of trading costs is not applicable in the case 
of the UK FIT scheme since there trading activities do not take place under the scheme. Mundaca 
et al. (2013) acknowledge that in some cases the categorization of TCs based on the project life 
cycle might be difficult. This is due the fact that sometimes a type of costs may be found in all 
phases of the life cycle of the project (e.g. due diligence, search for information). Nevertheless, the 
particular classification was developed in order to better clarify the typology and scale of TCs of 
RETs like the UK FIT scheme.   
 
Supplementary, the results of the analysis were compared with findings from similar studies in the 
field of RETs. Purpose of this comparison was to acknowledge similarities and divergencies 
between similar studies. After that the data of the UK FIT case were exposed to experts by asking 
them to confirm the results and express their views on the subject. The analysis of data is 
presented in Section 4. 
  
Planning 
Implementation M & V 
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Table 2-1 A categorization of TCs that are applicable to LCTs 
Cost Category Type of Costs 
Due Diligence Costs Costs associated with information collection and 
research of a LCT and its policy, financial, technical 
and legal aspects. 
Negotiation Costs Costs for coming to an agreement such as time 
spent negotiating, subcontracting of consultants’ 
fees, bargaining costs etc. 
Approval and Certification Costs Costs generated in cases where the transaction must 
be approved by a government agency before its 
operation (e.g. public bureaucracy costs) 
Monitoring and Verification (M&V) Costs Costs that arise when there is need to develop and 
implement an enforcement strategy in case of no-
compliance (e.g. metering costs, energy audits etc.) 
Trading Costs Costs generated in cases where there is a trade of 
certificates or quotas (e.g. fees paid to brokers for 
performing the trading of certificates) 
Source: Based on information from Mundaca et al. (2013) 
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3 Case Study – FIT in the UK 
3.1 Policy Background 
The feed-in tariff is defined as a guaranteed price policy which usually considered one of the most 
effective policy mechanisms for accelerating the deployment of renewable energy (Mendonça, 
2007). In the literature, FITs are also called renewable energy payments or standard offer 
contracts. The basic principle of this renewable energy policy is that any RE electricity generator 
can sell its electricity at a fixed price for a long-term period under particular terms depending on 
technology type and size, location etc. (Fouquet & Johansson, 2008). The first time that a FIT 
scheme implemented was in the United States (California) in the early 1980s (Gipe, 2010). Since 
1980s, the FIT scheme is widely used all over the world and principally in Denmark, Germany and 
Spain where it has been applying successfully and drove to a significant increase of RES electricity 
plants (Cory et al., 2009; Klein et al., 2010). According to o UNEP (2012), more than 65 countries 
and 27 states in the world were implementing FIT policies by 2012. More specifically, FITs have 
driven 64% of the global wind and 87% of solar PV capacity from 1990 until 2012 (UNEP, 2012). 
From 2002 the UK’s main support scheme for renewable electricity projects was Renewables 
Obligation (RO). Under the RO licensed electricity suppliers were required to source a specified 
proportion of electricity to their customers from renewable sources (Ofgem, 2013).3  The 
particular scheme proved to be intended only for professionals in the energy sector and complex 
for households or small businesses (Toke, 2007).  
 
A campaign that promoted the FIT scheme as a more effective policy for the deployment of 
small-scale renewable compared to the existing ones started by Dr. David Toke, in 2007. 
Significant role to the spreading of the campaign played the Renewable Energy Association (REA) 
and Friends of the Earth (FOE) with their unofficial support (D. Toke, personal communication, 
8 July 2013). During the campaigning of the scheme a number of events and speeches were carried 
out while plenty of articles were written.  For instance, a book about FITs with the title “Feed-in 
Tariffs – Accelerating the deployment of renewable energy” was published by Mendonça (2007) and was 
sent to ministers, NGOs and other interested parties in UK. As a result of that campaign, the UK 
government started a discussion on reforming the RO scheme and introducing a FIT scheme for 
small-scale renewable energy generation. In 2008, a new department called the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) was launched by the government. While few days after its 
launch, the introduction of a FIT for small-scale RE (with generation capacity up to 5MW) was 
announced in the Energy Act report (Energy Act 2008, chapter 32). According to the Energy Act 
2008, the FIT was decided to start being implemented from April 1st 2010. 
 
As mentioned above, in 2008 the UK government produced for the first time a comprehensive 
low carbon transition plan for the country. This plan determined the road map that should be 
followed for the national transition from 2008 until 2020. According to the plan, the EU 
committed at the UN Conference in Copenhagen (2009) to reduce its GHG emissions to 20% 
below 1990 levels by the year 2020. As an EU country the UK had to contribute to the 
achievement of this target. Thus, the government put in place the target to cut the UK emissions 
to 18% below 2008 levels and over one third (34%) below 1990 levels by 2020 (DECC, 2009a). 
Specifically, with the composition of this plan “carbon budgets” were allocated to all the major 
UK government departments. 
 
                                                 
3 This proportion (known as obligation) is increasing and set every year by the Ofgem.  
Further information about the RO scheme can be found at Ofgem’s website:  
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/Environment/RenewablObl/Pages/RenewablObl.aspx  
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In parallel with this transition plan was published the UK Renewable Energy Strategy document 
with more detailed plans about renewables. In the document it states:  
 
“To meet the challenge of climate change, we need to save carbon in every sector of 
the economy – this will mean a rapid transition to renewable energy. This Strategy 
shows how we can reach our goal of 15% of energy from renewables by 2020 almost 
a seven-fold increase in the share of renewables in scarcely more than a decade” 
(DECC, 2009b).  
 
Besides this, in the UK Renewable Energy Strategy the target of 30% of electricity from RES by 
2020 was set (DECC, 2009b). Within this target there is an aspiration that 6TWh or 1.6% of the 
UK electricity consumption will be delivered from small-scale (non – RO) RES by 2020 (DECC, 
2010; Walker 2012). Emphasis is also given on the fact that the abovementioned target should be 
met in a cost effective and sustainable way. Furthermore, in the document it is mentioned that 
increasing the use of renewable energy will enable the UK to recover some of its energy self-
sufficiency and will create many economic and employment opportunities.  Moreover, it is stated 
that experience with existing policy measures (such as RO) suggests that there was a need for a 
simpler and more accessible systems, which the public can engage with. Therefore, part of this 
strategy was the introduction of the right incentives for households, businesses and communities 
to promote small-scale clean electricity generation. According to DECC (2009b), the simplicity 
and income certainty of a FIT scheme seemed to be the most appropriate tool for the support of 
distributed renewable energy as well as for the encouragement of those outside the energy business 
to take up renewable generation. Specifically, in the strategy is mentioned: “FITs will support 
micro- and small-scale renewable electricity projects, where generation takes place either on-site or 
locally … through this ‘clean energy cash-back’ scheme we will, for the first time, provide support 
for distributed renewable energy that is comprehensive and long-term” (ibid). As regards the 
expected outcomes of the scheme, the government’s consultation report mentioned that: “It is 
expected that by 2020 the scheme will support over 750,000 small scale low carbon electricity 
installations and will have saved 7 million tonnes of carbon dioxide”. Moreover, according to the 
first FITs comprehensive review in 2011 the specific scheme is also designed to contribute to 
other low carbon goals. In specific, the scheme aims to: 
 
 involve people directly in the transition to a low-carbon economy and bring climate and 
energy issues in everyday life; 
 contribute to the development of a supply chain that will give the opportunity to 
households through cost effective measures to reduce their energy use and emissions; and 
 facilitate the adoption of carbon reduction measures, especially those related with the 
energy efficiency improvement of buildings (DECC, 2011) 
This first comprehensive review about FITs for solar PV (DECC, 2011) published 18 months 
after the introduction of the scheme and did not refer TCs or to potential sources of TCs. The 
findings of the review had to do with the successful deployment of the scheme and in particular 
for solar PV installations. Moreover, the review addressed the fact that installation costs for solar 
PV systems had fallen dramatically since the start of the programme and that the returns to new 
PV generators were higher than the intended. Therefore, it was proposed a reduction to the 
generation tariffs for solar PV installations, an introduction of energy efficiency requirement for 
getting the standard rate for solar PV as well as the introduction of multi-installation tariff rates for 
aggregated solar PV schemes. All these policy modifications were applied to the new solar PV 
installations with eligibility date on or after 1April 2012 (DECC, 2011). In 2012, the second 
comprehensive review of the FIT scheme was published which addressed non-PV technologies 
and scheme administration issues (DECC, 2012). In this document suggestions for the 
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improvement of data collection were asked in order to become more cost-effective. That was the 
only case where TCs were mentioned indirectly in a review. 
3.2 Design and Implementation 
In general terms, the UK FIT scheme is designed to offer long-term guarantee of payments to RE 
developers for the electricity they generate and to accelerate the deployment of small-scale low 
carbon electricity generation technologies of a capacity size up to 5MW located in England, Wales 
and Scotland (Ofgem, 2011). For the deployment of large-scale projects (more than 5MW) the RO 
programme continues to be implemented according to the DECC (2009a).  
3.2.1 How the Scheme Works 
Since the scope of this study is limited to the solar PVs which is the most deployed because of the 
FITs (Mendonça, 2011), a quotation of an example about the FIT process at this point might be 
helpful. If a customer wants to install a small-scale PV (up to 5MW), the first thing he should do is 
to contact a Micro-generation Certification Scheme (MCS) - accredited installation company. The 
company will undertake the necessary actions and discuss technical and financial issues with the 
customer in order to find out the best system option. After that, an appropriate system is agreed, 
installed and connected to the electricity grid. The customer registers the installation to the MCS 
Installation Database (MID) and gets a certificate with a unique number confirming MCS 
compliance. After that, this certificate should be sent to a FIT licensed electricity supplier if the 
electricity generator wants to get FIT payments. In addition, if the PV installation is attached or 
wired to provide power to a near building, the installer is obligated to provide an Energy 
Performance Certificate (EPC) which has been issued no more than 10 years before with a rating 
between A and D in order to meet the eligibility requirements. In cases where the EPC rating is 
below level D than the generator will receive a set lower tariff rate which will remain for the 
duration of the contract even if the EPC rating is improved afterwards. After gathering the 
necessary certificates mentioned above and other documents (like an initial meter reading), the RE 
generator sends an application for FIT payments to a licensed electricity supplier (usually is called 
FIT licensee). The date when the FIT licensee receives a complete application from the RE 
generator is called eligibility date. This date determines from when a generator is eligible to receive 
FIT payments for the electricity produced.  If the installation is up to 50kW then the FIT licensee 
checks if the generator is eligible for the FITs scheme and registers the installation to the Ofgem’s 
Central FIT Register. In case where the installation is over 50kW, the generator registers the 
installation with the Ofgem. After the completion of the registration, a contract between the FIT 
licensee and the RE generator is signed up. In order to get the FIT payents, the RE generator has 
to submit his meter reads every quarter to the FIT licensee. The FIT licensee pays the generator a 
generation tariff for all the electricity produced and, where applicable, an export tariff for the 
surplus electricity exported back to the national grid. For installations with capacity less than 
30kW, the exported electricity is deemed at 50% f generation. The FIT payments are offered by 
the electricity suppliers usually on a quarterly basis and the tariff period is 20 years. 1 The FIT 
payments change over time depending on the deployment levels of the eligible technologies. In 
particular, the degression mechanism for new solar PV installations takes place on a quarterly basis 
while the degression rate can vary between 3.5% and 28% per quarter (Ofgem, 2013c).In addition 
to the received generation and export payments4, the generator also beneFiTs by reducing his 
energy bills. Electricity produced by the solar panels will feed directly into the generator’s house; 
hence imported electricity from the grid will be decreased. Lastly, all the FIT licensees are required 
to submit sales and payment data to Ofgem every quarter. By doing so helps Ofgem to administer 
                                                 
4 Household generators do not pay Income Tax on the generation and/or the export tariffs they receive since they use the RET to 
produce electricity mainly for their own. 
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better the scheme, to calculate and make/receive the appropriate levelisation payments to/from 
every FIT licensee. The levelisation process takes place every quarter and in the end of every FIT 
year. If the amount of the FIT licensee’s market share contribution exceeds his FIT contribution 
then he is required to make a levelisation payment to Ofgem’s Levelisation Fund. In the opposite 
situation, the FIT licensee will receive a levelisation payment from Ofgem. An illustration of the 
FIT scheme operation is given in Figure 3-1 (Ofgem, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 3-1 How the FIT scheme works 
Source: Based on information from Ofgem E-Serve, 2010: “Delivering a Successful GB Feed-in Tariff – An 
Ofgem Operational Perspective” Presentation by Keith Duncan, 25 October 2010. 
 
3.2.2 Generation and Export Tariffs 
From a design perspective, the UK FIT scheme is different from other FITs being implemented in 
Europe (Mendonça, 2011). First of all, the UK FIT scheme is applied only for the deployment of 
small-scale projects with a total installation capacity up to 5MW while for instance the German 
one is for all scales. The RET covered by the UK FIT scheme are five in total including: solar PV 
up to a maximum total installed capacity of 5MW, wind up to 5MW, hydro up to 5MW, anaerobic 
digestion up to 5MW and micro Combined Heat and Power (CHP) up to 2kW (DECC, 2012). 
Additionally, a fact that makes the UK scheme unique is that the FIT Licensees should make two 
kinds of tariff payments to the accredited installations that use renewable electricity technologies. 
In other words, FIT payments are splint into two kinds, the “generation” and “export” tariffs 
(Ofgem, 2013a). 
 
Once a renewable small-scale system has been registered, the FIT Licensee pays the RE generator 
a generation tariff which is a set rate for each unit (kWh) of electricity generated - whether the 
generator feeds it into the grid or uses it. The generation tariff is the main payment of the UK FIT 
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scheme and is paid on the basis of actual meter readings provided by the generator and not on 
estimated generation (Ofgem, 2013a). The level of these payments depends on: a) the type of RE 
technology, b) the capacity of the system and c) the date of installation and is guaranteed for a 
certain period (up to 20 years) (Cherrington et al., 2013). Also, unlike other FIT systems, the 
generation tariff payments are index-linked to inflation. In simply terms, the payments remain 
stable in real terms also in cases where the value of the national currency changes (DECC, 2009d). 
Examples of FIT generation tariff levels during the years for small solar PV systems are given on 
Table 3-1. Specifically, one can notice that a big drop-off on solar PV payment levels took place 
between years 2 and 3. The DECC decided to reduce the level of the payments since the number 
of PV installations was really high while the installation costs of such systems has dropped 
dramatically (DECC, 2011). 
 
In cases where the FIT generator exports electricity back to the grid, the FIT Licensee pays him an 
export tariff for each unit. In other words, export tariffs are bonus payments for every kWh of 
surplus electricity that a RE system exports to the grid (Ofgem, 2013a). Unlike the generation 
tariff, the level of the export tariff is the same for all the technologies (ibid). While the level of the 
tariff is index-linked like the level of the generation tariff in order to track the retail price index. 
For domestic systems with installed capacity up to 30kW where there is no smart meter installed, 
the exported electricity is deemed to 50% of the electricity generated (Secretary of State, 2013). Of 
course, if a generator believes that his exports are higher than 50% of the total output he is 
allowed to install an export meter and get paid on the metered level of exports (Ofgem, 2013b). 
The aim in the near future is that smart meters will be widely used from the UK households but to 
date an export meter is installed only for systems above 30kW (EnergySavingTrust, 2013). For the 
FIT year 1 and 2 the value of the exported electricity was set by the Secretary of State at 3.30 
pence per kilowatt hour while for the FIT years 3 and 4 was set at 4.64p/kWh (Ofgem, 2013b).  
 
In general, the generation tariff is higher than the export one and this because the DECC 
considers that rewarding of on-site use more likely can change the energy use behavior 
(Mendonça, 2011). See Table B-1 in Appendix that presents the FIT generation and export 
payment levels for PV eligible installations for the FIT year 1 (i.e. April 2010 to March 2011). 
 
 Table 3-1 FIT Payment Levels for Solar PV systems with installed capacity up to 50kW 
System Size FIT Year 1 
(2010/2011) 
(pence/kWh) 
FIT Year 2 
(2011/2012) 
(p/kWh)* 
FIT Year 3 
(2012/2013) 
(p/kWh)* 
FIT Year 4 
(2013/2014) 
(p/kWh)* 
Duration 
(years)** 
≤4kW 36.1 37.8 15.44 15.44 20 
4-10kW 36.1 37.8 13.99 13.99 20 
10-50kW 35.5 35.5 13.92 13.03 20 
*Adjusted by the Retail Price Index 
** The tariff lifetime has been reduced, in the end of the FIT Year 2, for solar PV from 25 to 20 
years for all the new installations 
Source: DECC (2011) and http://www.FiTariffs.co.uk/eligible/levels/  
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3.2.3 Key Actors of the Scheme 
Under the UK FIT scheme a number of actors are required to get involved such as DECC, 
Ofgem, Gemserv, electricity supply companies (FIT Licensees) and of course the electricity 
generators. To begin with, DECC is responsible for the design of the scheme as well as for its 
legislation. It also sets the tariff rates for every FIT year and is responsible for the policy (Ofgem, 
2013c). The administrator of the FIT programme, who is responsible for overseeing the whole 
scheme, is Ofgem (The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets). Ofgem administers day to day 
functions in relation to the scheme and organizes and run the Central FIT Register (CFR), which 
is a database of the accredited installations (Ofgem, 2013c). This database was formed in order to 
ensure compliance, to identify errors and to facilitate switching (Mendonça, 2011). Ofgem is also 
obligated to publish statistical information from the CFR such as the total number of installations 
that receive FIT payments every year. In addition, the particular office administers the levelisation 
process that takes place quarterly and annually. During this process, the Ofgem should determine 
whether a Licensed Electricity supplier will have to make a levelisation payment or will receive 
one. In order to determine this, the market share contribution and FIT contribution of each 
Licensed Electricity Supplier is calculated and compared. The FIT contribution includes the 
following payments and costs: a) generation payments, b) net metered export payments, c) net 
deemed export payments and d) qualifying FIT costs (Ofgem, 2013a). The qualifying FIT costs are 
defined as the administration costs incurred by FIT licensees for each new or ongoing installation. 
The value of these costs is determined annually by the Secretary of State (Ofgem, 2012). Detailed 
information about the level of qualifying FIT costs is given on Table B-2 in the Appendix. 
Moreover, Ofgem accredits installations with a capacity above 50kW or micro and small scale 
anaerobic digestion and hydro installations. Finally, the office is responsible for ensuring that 
suppliers comply with the FIT scheme requirements (Ofgem, 2013c). The key duties and functions 
of Ofgem under the FIT scheme are summarized in Table 3-2 below.  
 
Table 3-2 Summary of Ofgem’s Key Responsibilities under the FIT Scheme 
Ofgem’s Role in the FIT Scheme 
 Accreditation of eligible installations 
 Establishment and operation of the Central FIT Register 
 Calculation of FIT payment rates 
 Compliance functions 
 Periodic & annual levelisation 
 Facilitate switching of generators 
 Information and guidance 
 Reporting (e.g. the total number of FIT generators registered on the CFR, FIT payments made etc.) 
Source: Based on information compiled from the FIT guidance for renewable installation, Ofgem, 2013c; The 
Ofgem website; The FIT: Annual Report 2010-2011published by Ofgem (2011); FIT presentation “Delivering a 
Successful GB Feed-in Tariff – An Ofgem Operational Perspective” by Keith Duncan, 2010 
 
Another key actor of the scheme is Gemserv. Gemserv is the licensee for the Micro-generation 
Certification Scheme (MCS). According to the guidance for renewable installations published by 
the Ofgem (2013c), the MCS is an internationally recognised quality assurance scheme which 
certifies micro-generation technologies that produce electricity or heat from renewable sources. In 
the case of the FIT scheme, an MCS certification must be granted to an installation in order to be 
eligible for FIT payments. Gemserv is a consultancy company that was licensed by the Secretary of 
State for Energy to certify installations of small scale electricity renewable generators across the 
UK and to grant the MCS mark (Mendonça, 2011). Further, Gemserv oversees the MCS and 
certificates product and installation companies to the MCS standards. Today there are plenty of 
certification bodies like Gemserv in the UK, fact that enabled more installation companies to be 
certificated. 
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Additionally, a party that plays a main role under the FIT scheme is the electricity supply 
companies which under the legislation are called “FIT Licensees”. According to the first FIT 
Annual Report published in 2011 by Ofgem, licensed electricity suppliers operating in the UK with 
more than 50,000 domestic customers are required to become mandatory FIT licensees and to 
make FIT payments to eligible generators. Mandatory FIT licensees cannot exit the scheme unless 
their status changes5. Smaller energy companies with less than 50,000 domestic customers can elect 
if they want to become voluntary FIT licensees and make FIT payments. Voluntary FIT licensees 
are obligated to remain in the scheme only for the duration of the FIT year in which they enter. 
Both mandatory and voluntary FIT licensees are called FIT licensees. The main obligations of the 
FIT licensees are summarized in Table 3-3. At this point it is worth to mention that energy 
companies do not make any profits during the implementation of the scheme. In particular, Dr. 
Toke stated: “FIT licensees do not make money out of the FIT; marginally they lose money 
because it is taking income away from their own power plants” (personal communication, 8 July 
2013). During the first year of the scheme there were 25 registered FIT licensees (Ofgem, 2011) 
while today there are 29 (Ofgem, website). A list of the recent registered FIT licensed suppliers is 
presented in the Appendix (Figure B-1). If a small licensed electricity company does not elect to 
become a voluntary FIT licensee, then is known as a non-FIT licensee. Even though non-FIT 
licensees do not make FIT payments to eligible generators, they are required to contribute to the 
costs of the scheme (e.g. make levelisation payments) based on their market share. A summary of 
the actors involved and their actions during the implementation of the scheme is presented in 
Figure B-2 in Appendix. 
 
Table 3-3 The FIT Licensees’ Obligations 
Main Responsibilities of Mandatory & Voluntary FIT Licensees 
 Accreditation of generator less than 50kW 
 Registration of eligible installations onto the CFR in a timely manner 
 Management of application process 
 Examination of the data accuracy placed on the CFR  
 Calculation of FIT payments based on the information held on CFR 
 Payment of tariffs 
 Inform Ofgem about FIT payments 
 Verification of generation and/or export meter reading at least once per two years 
 Assistance of FIT applicants about the scheme- Customer service 
 Levelisation payments 
Source: Based on information compiled from the FIT: guidance for licensed electricity suppliers, Ofgem, 2011; the 
FIT guidance for renewable installation, Ofgem, 2013c; FIT presentation “Delivering a Successful GB Feed-in 
Tariff – An Ofgem Operational Perspective” by Keith Duncan, 2010 
 
Other actors being involved indirectly into the FIT scheme are Domestic Energy Assessors 
(DEA), electricity distribution companies and companies that install solar panels for “free” (i.e. 
they take the FIT payments and give the residents free day-time electricity). DEA are organizations 
that can produce the required Energy Performance Certificates that RE generators need in order 
prove the energy efficiency of their home and to get the standard rate of FITs 
(EnergySavingTrust, 2013). Electricity distribution companies are entities that distribute electricity 
in UK licensed by Ofgem. In some cases these distribution operators are owned by energy 
companies that take part to the FIT scheme (Energy Networks Association website). The only 
                                                 
5In the UK there are six large energy supply companies which are legally obliged to make the FIT payments: British Gas, EDF, 
E.ON, N Power, Scottish Power and Scottish & Southern Energy (SSE). 
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case where an electricity distribution company is involved (indirectly) is when a project needs a 
new or upgraded connection to the electricity network (Bird, personal communication). Lastly, 
since the FIT scheme was launched Rent-a-Roof (RAR) schemes appeared as an alternative 
method of installing a domestic solar PV system. In specific, under these schemes several 
companies offer “free” solar panels, in exchange for a proportion of the tariff payments. In other 
words, these companies install, maintain and insure a PV project on the roof of a householder that 
cannot afford to install the system himself (Mendonça, 2011). According to the Energy Saving 
Trust which is a social enterprise and the dominant energy and carbon advisor in England, the 
share of the RAR schemes in the UK PV market was almost 20% in 2011 (ibid). All the 
abovementioned actors have an indirect involvement with the UK FIT scheme and hence, their 
activities under the scheme are limited. 
3.3 Early Performance 
So far, it seems that the FIT scheme has been successful in empowering people to get involved in 
local, green energy generation. Particularly, the scheme has been really successful in increasing the 
small –scale PV installations (Cherrington et al., 2013; Mendonça, 2011; Walker, 2012). According 
to the first FIT Annual Report (Ofgem, 2011), there were 30,201 total installations during the first 
year of the scheme (from 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2011) while the total capacity of all 
installations was 108.3 MW. In addition, the technology with the largest installed capacity was solar 
PV with 77.7 MW (71.7 % out of the total capacity) and 28,556 installations (94.4% of total 
installations), followed by wind with a capacity of 18.9 MW (17.5%) and 1,339 installations 
(4.43%).  The number of solar PV installations during the first year was far ahead of what was 
projected, therefore the DECC reviewed the scheme. According to projections before the start of 
the scheme the total capacity of solar PV would be 137 MW within the first two years. However, 
already in September 2011 the installed capacity of PV was 255 MW and significantly above the 
projections. The reason behind this was the fact that the FIT rates for solar PV were attractive and 
much higher compared to the installation costs of the technology and consequently the financial 
returns to the RE developers were more than 5% on investment. Moreover, Gill Owen who used 
to be non-executive board member of Ofgem stated that in the case of solar PV the tariff rates 
were high resulting to lower TCs related to the scheme. Therefore, the uptake of domestic PV 
installations was not so suprising (personal communication, 8th July 2013). As a result, the DECC 
announced reductions of the tariffs for all new PV installations with total installed capacity more 
than 50kW in order to provide the intended 5% rate of return on capital and to avoid 
overcompensation. In particular, the report stated: “…the number of solar PV installations is far 
ahead of projections. If this trend were allowed to continue, the affordability of the whole FITs 
scheme would soon be under threat. In the light of this budgetary risk we consider that it is 
necessary to seek views now on proposals for new tariffs for solar PV.” (DECC, 2011). The old 
(2011) and the proposed generation tariffs for solar PV retrieved from the consultation document 
on FITs for solar PVs (DECC, 2011) are presented on Table B-3 in Appendix. Specifically, the 
impacts of this trend could unfold in two sides according to DECC (2011). Firstly, the generators 
would be overcompensated and the consumers that finally pay the FITs through their bills would 
be discriminated. Secondly, this trend would drive to a breach of the funding envelope for FITs 
and consequently the availability of FITs for non-PV technologies would be limited (ibid). At this 
point it is important to mention that several respondents to this consultation mentioned that the 
decision of the Government to reduce the solar PV FITs did not take into account the existence 
of peripheral and maintenance costs which did not reduce throughout the years (DECC, 2011).  
 
A comprehensive statistical overview about the performance of the FIT scheme during its three 
years of implementation is given by the last report published by Ofgem, the 12th issue of the 
“Feed-in Tariff Update Quarterly” (Ofgem, 2013d). According to the report, from the 1st of April 
2010 to 31st of March 2013, 379,530 renewable installations with a total installed capacity of 
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1,792.46 MW were registered under the FIT scheme. In particular, within the first year of the 
scheme were registered almost 30,000 renewable installations (Ofgem, 2011) while during the 
second year the registered installations were 217,741(Ofgem, 2012) and in the third year 131,864 
(Ofgem, 2013d). Figure 3-2 presents the collective increase in both the number of installations and 
the total installed capacity registered within the first three years of the scheme. What can be 
noticed from the figure below is that newly registered capacity is increasing more rapidly than the 
number of installations being registered.  
Figure 3-2 Registered FIT installations by number and total installed capacity (1 April 2010 - 31 March 2013) 
Source: Ofgem (2013d) 
 
Furthermore, according to the report solar PV technology is the most dominant under the FITs 
both in terms of the number of installations and installed capacity (Ofgem, 2013d). A reason for 
that the fact that it is easier and cheaper for a householder to install a solar PV system on his roof 
rather than to install a wind turbine. In particular, solar PV installations constitute almost 89% 
(1585 MW) of the total installed capacity and 98.5% (374,014) of the total number of installations 
under the scheme.  In the second place is wind technology which accounts for 7% (133 MW) of 
total installed capacity and for 1.2% of all installations (4,644). As regards the other technologies, 
anaerobic digestion and hydro installations account for 2% each of the total installed capacity 
while micro CHP installations constitute almost 1% of the installed capacity. Figure 3-3 illustrates 
the breakdown of the total number of installations registered by technology type for the period 1 
April 2010 – 31 March 2013. The figure demonstrates that solar PV installations represent the 
largest part of installations, with 98.5% of the total. Wind technology makes up the 1.2% while the 
rest FIT eligible technologies constitute the remaining 0.3%. 
  
30 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Total number of installations registered by technology type for 1 April 2010– 31 March 2013 
Source: Ofgem (2013d), modified 
In Figure 3-4 the total installed capacity by technology type for April 2010 – March 2013 is 
illustrated. Additionally, the largest share of the total FIT installations and the total installed 
capacity consists from domestic installations.  In specific, domestic installations make up almost 
97% of the total installations and 68% of the installed capacity. Domestic installations are followed 
by commercial, industrial and community installations. From a regional point of view, the highest 
total installed capacity is founded at the South of England and in particular at the South West. 
Once again solar PV installations constitute more than 85% of the total installed capacity in every 
region. Scotland is the only region where PV installations make up only 50% of the installed 
capacity while wind and hydro account for 35% and 15% respectively (see Figure B-3 in 
Appendix). 
 
 
Figure 3-4 Total installed capacity by technology type for 1 April 2010– 31 March 2013 
Source: Ofgem (2013d), modified 
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So far, it is evident that the FIT scheme in the UK has positive impacts on the green energy 
industry since almost 30,000 RE projects have been installed under the scheme as of 31 March 
2013 (Ofgem, 2013d). Furthermore, according to the figures published by Ofgem the most 
deployed RET (both in terms of number of installations and installed capacity) under the scheme 
is the solar PV panels. While from a regional point of view, southern areas of UK acquired the 
highest installed capacity of RE generation. Nevertheless, Ofgem’s report (2013d) mentions that 
the popularity of the scheme seems to decline. In specific, the total number of installations has 
dropped significantly the first quarter of 2013. Potential reason of this drop could be the 
degression that the DECC made to the FIT payment levels for installations registered after the 
April of 2012. The decline in the number of registered installations might indicate that the RE 
market is stabilizing especially for the case of solar PVs. To sum up, from the deployment statistics 
so far it seems that the predicted contribution of electricity from FIT projects 1.6% out of the UK 
2020 electricity supply is a task at hand (Walker, 2012). However, nobody can predict with 
certainty if this target will be achieved since tariff levels might be adjusted from the DECC (ibid). 
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4 Research Findings 
4.1 Nature of TCs in the FIT 
As mentioned in the previous section, TCs can fall into five general categories: search for 
information costs, negotiation costs, approval and certification costs, monitoring and verification 
costs and trading costs. In the case of the UK FIT scheme, the categories of negotiation and 
trading costs were not identified since the particular policy instrument does not involve trading 
activities (i.e. trading of certificates) while the level of the FIT tariffs are fixed for each technology 
and set by the Government. The rest types of TCs where found in different phases of the life cycle 
of the scheme including: i) planning, ii) implementation and iii) monitoring and verification. Table 
4.1 summarizes the sources of TCs during the life cycle of the scheme. It is also important to 
mention that in the analysis are addressed not only TCs borned by the obliged actors but also 
those borned by the authorities (i.e. DECC, Ofgem). 
Before moving to the identification of the nature of TCs during the different phase of the UK FIT 
life cycle, a general and simple analytical model is presented to comprehend the potentially 
negative impacts of TCs in markets and hence in RET markets that policies like FITs promote. 
The model was developed by Dudek and Wiener in 1996 and in accordance with it, the existence 
of TCs increases the buyer’s costs and/or lowers the supplier’s (net) price and shifts the demand 
and supply curves. As a result, the new equilibrium quantity traded will be lower than the one 
would be in the absence of TCs (Dudek & Wiener 1996; Krey, 2004; Stavins, 1995) (see Figure 2-
1). In the case of no transaction costs, the equilibrium of supply (S) and demand (D) emerges at 
Qopt purchases as outlined in Figure 2-1 below. Nevertheless, if either the buyer or supplier or 
both bear TCs, the equilibrium quantity will be lower than Qopt. In the existence of TC borne only 
by the buyer (illustrated by the demand curve Dtc) the traded quantity will be Q1. If the TCs are 
borne by the supplier (illustrated by the supply curve Stc) the traded quantity will be Q2. If the TCs 
are borne by both, then Q3 will be the traded quantity. Generally, as TCs increase, the gap between 
buyer’s cost and supplier’s gain widens while the traded quantity will decrease (Dudek & Wiener, 
1996).  
 
 
Figure 4-1 Supply and demand in the presence of transaction costs 
Source: Dudek and Wiener (1996) modified 
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4.1.1  TCs related to Planning 
Before identifying the sources of TCs related to the planning phase it is important to clarify that 
the planning phase is divided in two parts. The first one contains planning activities related to the 
preparation of the scheme by the DECC and the Government. While the second part, has to do 
with the planning activities that the obliged parties must undertake before the implementation of 
the scheme. In simply terms, the sources of TCs during the planning phase are examined both 
from the side of the regulator which is the DECC and the obliged parties. 
To begin with, the response of the UK to FITs can be characterized relatively slow compared to 
other EU countries if we consider that it was introduced in 2010. According to an energy expert of 
Birmingham University, D. Toke, before 2007 very few people in the UK knew what the FIT was 
about, including people from the academic world and industry (personal communication, 8 July 
2013). This implies that there was need to search for information about FITs and how they already 
work in other countries. In order the final design of the UK FIT scheme to be decided, a 
consultation for proposals took place from July until October of 2009. During this consultation 
process on FITs, responses from individuals, organizations, trade associations, licensed electricity 
suppliers, technology manufactures and installers, consultancies and academia were received 
(DECC, 2009d). In addition, the DECC cooperated with Ofgem, licensed electricity suppliers and 
trade associations in order to develop a draft with the main elements of the scheme. Again, DECC 
consulted licensed electricity suppliers as well as the UK Business Council for Sustainable Energy 
(UKBCSE) to specify the roles of electricity suppliers (ibid). Therefore, it is clear that during the 
preparation of the scheme DECC has to undertake a number of activities that requires time and 
resources. In other words, the preparation period included TCs related to search for information 
and consultations which are borne by the DECC. These sources of TCs can be described critical 
since all the activities mentioned above were necessary for the development of the FIT design. 
DECC was contacted in order to provide further details regarding this preparation phase and its 
potential TCs. Unfortunately, the DECC receives a great amount of similar requests so it was not 
possible for them to respond within the thesis timeframe. 
 
Regarding the planning phase from the prespective of the obliged parties, sources of TCs are 
described below. Primarily, transaction costs are identified in relation to the search for 
information, in particular for renewable electricity generators. These actors have to search for 
information and choose the most suitable technology for their case. Additionally, they have to 
identify a suitable MCS - accredited installation company operating in their region in order to get a 
MCS certificate. During the planning phase, the MCS – accredited installation company undertakes 
a pre-study consisting of technical and financial investigations in order to find out the best system 
solution. These detailed pre-studies can be regarded as potential sources of TCs.  
 
TCs also arise from the search for a Domestic Energy Assessor (DEA) who can produce the 
required Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) and the search of an electricity supplier who will 
pay the FITs. Additionally, if the installation has a total installed capacity greater than 30kW then 
an export meter is required in order to receive FIT export payments. In this case, the FIT 
generator has to contact a Distribution Network Operator (DNO) for an export meter point 
administration number (MPAN) and to appoint a meter operator for the installation of an export 
meter. After gathering all the appropriate documents and certificates, the electricity generator 
should send his FIT application to the energy supplier that he has chosen. Only in the case in 
which the installation capacity is more than 50kW, the generator has to register his installation 
directly with Ofgem and then to provide his energy supplier with a ROO-FIT Accreditation 
reference in order to request FIT payments. Furthermore, there is the case of RAR schemes that 
mentioned in Section 3.2.3. If a domestic householder wants to get FIT payments but cannot 
afford to install a solar PV system then he should search and contact one of the companies that 
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offer “free” solar panels, in exchange for a proportion of the tariff payments. This might also 
contain TCs related to the search for information and some negotiation costs borne both by the 
RE generator and the specific company. Moreover, some TCs might be generated if the house 
where the PV system installed be sold. In such a case the old and new owners would have to 
inform the energy supplier for potential changes and to agree a contract. Nevertheless, since the 
share of RAR schemes in the UK PV market is small, TCs associated with them will also be of low 
importance. 
The UK FIT scheme mainly depends on the regulation and most of the transactions are fixed by 
law. As a consequence, the identity of obligated FIT suppliers is also fixed by law and RE 
generator can find all the registered FIT licensed suppliers at Ofgem’s website. Thus, costs arising 
due to the need for information on the credibility of the obligated energy suppliers are very low. In 
general, due diligence mainly occurring during the preparation of FIT application is identified as 
the main source of TCs, particularly for renewable-electricity generators. 
4.1.2 TCs related to Implementation 
During the implementation phase, the first source of TCs is related to the assessment of the 
acquired information. After receiving the FIT applications from the generators, FIT suppliers have 
to undertake a number of eligibility checks (i.e. cross-reference the installation with the MCS 
database, assess installation against the energy efficiency criteria and multi installation rules, check 
installation location address etc.) in order to confirm the eligibility of the installation (Ofgem, 
2013b).  
 
After ensuring that the information provided by the FIT generator is accurate, the FIT supplier 
collects the necessary data and prepares the appropriate documents in order to gain the approval 
from Ofgem and to register the installation to the CFR. According to official information from 
FIT suppliers’ websites it may take 8-12 weeks for the suppliers to assess and approve an 
application and send back a FIT acceptance plan with the terms and conditions to the generator. 
In this case, TCs are identified in relation to the approval and certification procedures. At the 
moment it seems that the number of the legally obliged energy suppliers is limited since the 
mandatory FIT licensees under the UK FITs are six. Thus, the administrative costs are distributed 
in few hands and consequently TCs become higher. At this point worths to mention that when the 
DECC (2012) asked consultation about the tariff levels and some issues related to data collection 
most of the FIT electricity suppliers responded that individual installation data should be collected 
centrally. However, some of them mentioned that must be economically viable and not to pose 
too much of a burden. While others expressed that their main concern was the costs related to the 
collection of this data and that it would be more cost-effective if smart meters had a wide 
application (DECC, 2012). On the other hand, DECC stated its future intention to consult with all 
the FIT licensees and to find out the potential cost or the burden that this data collection could 
place on them (ibid). Additional sources of TCs can be considered the time and management 
needed in order to gain approval for RE installations from Ofgem and to register the installation. 
Furthermore, due to regular changes of the FIT regulations (e.g. reductions in the (solar PV) tariffs 
levels every three months (DECC, 2011)), FIT licensees have to calculate and make FIT payments 
in accordance with new information.  
 
During this phase, negotiation and bargaining costs were not identified as a significant source of 
TCs since the terms of the contract and the tariff rates are set by the Government. In other words, 
no time or negotiation process is spent between generators and FIT suppliers negotiating the level 
of FIT generation payments. Only in the case where the generator does not have an export meter 
there is a possibility of negotiation between the actors for the export payment level. However, 
most of the FIT licensees deem the export payment as 50% of the electricity generated since 
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Ofgem has advised them to do so. In addition, the time period on which the FIT payments should 
commence is fixed by the Ofgem and hence the FIT licensees have to make the payments on a 
quarterly basis.  
As regards the RE generator’s and FIT supplier’s activities related to the transaction during the 
implementation phase between them and the grid electricity distributors are very limited. 
According to the Energy Networks Association in the UK, no financial transactions take place 
between grid electriciry distributors and energy companies as a result of the FIT scheme (R. Le 
Gros, personal communication, 15 August 2013). In addition, the electricity distribution company 
Northern Powergrid confirmed that they have a little direct involvement with the FIT scheme, 
which is operated by the electricity supply companies (J. Bird, personal communication, 1 August 
2013). In particular, for the case of small-scale electricity installations where the output of the 
project is less than 3.68kW for a single phase supply, the installer only need to notify the electricity 
distribution company about the project. The company’s Head of Sustainability, Jon Bird, mentioned: 
“Northern Powergrid’s involvement is only concerning whether the project needs a new or 
improved connection to our network.  It is for the installer to make arrangements with the energy 
supply company to be paid the FIT and the value of the electricity exported.  We have no 
involvement with that process.” Thus from the grid electricity distributors’ point of view, there are 
no activities under which TCs can be generated. 
Overall, in the implementation phase of the FIT scheme TCs were identified in connection with 
searching for and assessing information and approval and certification procedures. These TCs are 
mainly borne by the FIT licensees. The fact that most of the TCs costs are borne by the FIT 
licensees was also confirmed by the Senior Manager of the Governance & Renewables 
Compliance Environmental Programs at Ofgem. During our interview, Mr. Duncan mentioned: 
“The FIT licensee is the one required to process and register the FIT application so it will be the 
FIT licensee who will face most of the TCs” (K. Duncan, personal communication, 15 July 2013). 
Unfortunately, Ofgem does not track nor keep such information. Nevertheless, the Secretary of 
State (2013) recognizes only one category of costs called “administrative or qualifying costs” which 
the FIT licensees can claim from Ofgem. The level of the qualifying costs that FIT licensees can 
claim for each generator are determined by the Secretary of the State and are differentiated based 
on the type of the licensee (large or small) and the type of the generator (ongoing or new). These 
costs are included to the calculation of the levelisation payments made by Ofgem. Further 
information about the level of these quantifying costs can be found on Table B-2 in the Appendix. 
4.1.3 TCs related to Monitoring 
Before identifying the nature of TCs in the monitoring phase it is important to mention that there 
is always a discussion in the literature whether or not monitoring costs are sources of TCs. In 
particular, some studies consider metering costs as part of the implementation phase and do not 
analyze them separately. For example, Michaelowa et al. (2003) included monitoring costs into the 
implementation phase of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and defined them only as 
costs to collect data. 
In the case of the UK FIT scheme, monitoring and metering can be described as the dominant 
activities that take place. Monitoring and verification costs which are also known as “metering 
costs” take the form of the time and/or resources needed to audit and assure the policy’s 
compliance. In the case of the FIT scheme, metering costs are mainly borne by the FIT licensees 
and Ofgem which administers the scheme.  
Particularly, one of the main responsibilities of the FIT licensees is to ensure that the data 
submitted to Ofgem are accurate and to update or amend the CFR with new information. 
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Moreover, they have to assess in a regular basis the generation and/or export meter readings that 
they receive from the generators against expected generation. According to Ofgem (2013a), they 
are obliged to verify generation and/or export meter readings at least once every two years with 
onsite visits while desk based investigations should be proportionate to the degree of abnormal 
readings. In order to secure themselves against making FIT payments to ineligible installations, 
FIT licensees have to spend time in order to ensure the eligibility of the FIT generators. Besides 
this, FIT licensees have to spend time and resources for ensuring their compliance to regulation 
amendments. These costs of changing strategies, due to changes in regulations are called 
adjustment costs according to Dijk et al. (2003). 
As regards Ofgem, TCs are generated due to approval procedures of the RE installations and 
monitoring the ongoing participation of participants. Ofgem has to calculate the FIT contribution 
of each licensee and combine it with their electricity sales data (periodically and annually) in order 
to ensure an equal distribution of the scheme’s costs among the FIT licensees and make the 
appropriate levelisation payments. Additionally, in a periodic and annual basis, Ofgem has to 
monitor FIT licensees’ compliance with the FIT Order requirements. Part of this monitoring 
procedure is sample reviews and inspections of the processes that FIT licensees follow. By doing 
so, Ofgem aims to verify the FIT licensees’ compliance. These audits may include checkings 
whether:  a) FIT licensees are making the necessary checks on the MCS in order to verify claims of 
certification and/or accreditation for eligible Installations, b) FIT licensees’ arrangements for 
checking information provided by the FIT generator are appropriate or c) FIT licensees' 
levelisation processes are robust (Ofgem, 2012). Furthermore, every year, Ofgem review a sample 
of FIT generators and registered installations in order to examine the levels of compliance. While 
at least once per year an independent organization is used to confirm the information given by 
FIT licensees.  The expenses borned by Ofgem to insist on compliance in cases where 
discrepancies are discovered are called enforcement costs (Dijk et al., 2003).  
 
At the same time, Ofgem has to annually report on the FIT licensees’ compliance, the total 
number of FIT generators registered on the CFR, the number of MWh generated and the FIT 
payments made to generators during the year. In addition, supplementary reports/reviews and 
adjustments of the FIT scheme (i.e. degression of FIT payments) are published whenever is 
necessary.  
 
  
37 
 
Table 4-1 Identified sources of TCs under the UK FIT scheme 
FIT Phases Sources of TCs Actors bearing TCs 
P
la
n
n
in
g
 
Search for information 
Consultations for the desing of 
the scheme 
DECC (Regulator) 
Search for and assessment of 
acquired information: 
‒ Search for technology 
solutions 
‒ Search for certified 
installation companies 
 Application preparation 
Renewable-electricity generators 
Im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
Application assessment 
Approval and certification costs 
Administrative costs 
Calculation of FIT payments- 
Billing 
Paying 
FIT Licensees (energy supply 
companies) 
M
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
 &
 V
e
ri
fi
c
a
ti
o
n
 
Auditing of meter readings and 
FIT payments-metering costs 
Adjustment costs 
 
FIT Licensees (energy supply 
companies) 
 
Monitoring FIT licensees’ and 
FIT generators’ compliance: 
‒ Random checks 
‒ Hiring thrird parties for 
auditing 
Enforcement costs 
Cost recovery & levelisation 
Annual reports and assessments 
Ofgem 
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4.2 Contrasting Results with Previous Research 
In this subsection, a comparison and critical review between the sources of TCs found within the 
UK FIT scheme and the ones identified by similar studies is provided. In particular, based on the 
main phases of the scheme, potential similarities and divergences between my results and similar 
studies in the field are acknowledged. 
4.2.1 TCs related to Planning 
According to a comprehensive meta-analysis of Mundaca et al. (2013), TCs during the planning 
phase of renewable energy technologies are identified as information costs. More specifically, in 
their study Skytte et al. (2003) argue that TCs commence due to search for information and pre-
feasibility studies about the choice of technology and the search for interested partners. 
Simultaneously, Langniss (2003) also identified the search of information as a major source of TCs 
when he compared the TCs associated with the German Renewable Energy Act (EEG) and the 
Texas Renewable Portofolio Standard (RPS). In the study of Langniss (2003), parties that mostly 
borne these TCs were new firms entering the market. As regards the TCs related to the planning 
phase of the UK FIT scheme, it was found that TCs arose from the search for information about 
technology solutions and search for certified companies (i.e. MCS-installation companies, EPC 
certification companies, electricity suppliers). In addition, the assessment of information mainly 
occurring during the preparation of FIT applications was also identified as source of TCs, 
particularly for renewable-electricity generators. When the results of similar studies in the field and 
the results of this study are compared it becomes clear that both sides identify due diligence as the 
main source of TCs in the planning phase of a project. Nevertheless, it is also obvious that similar 
studies do not include sources of TCs related to the preparation of a scheme from the authorities 
in their analysis. In other words, search for information and consultation costs borne by the 
authorities during the planning phase are addressed only in the case of UK FITs. 
4.2.2 TCs related to Implementation 
When comparing the results of similar studies with the results of this analysis some differences 
come to the picture. Specifically, contrary to the studies of Finon and Perez (2007), Langniss 
(2003) and Skytte et al. (2003), the TCA of the UK FIT sheme indicates that negotiation and 
bargaining costs are not identified as a significant source of TCs since the level of tariff rates are 
fixed by the law. As a consequence, no remarkable time is spent between generators and FIT 
suppliers negotiating for the level of FIT generation payments or the contract terms. Particularly, 
Finon and Perez (2007) argued that critical source of TCs for policy instruments, like RO or 
tradable green certificate schemes, consists the contract and negotiation procedures among 
renewable electricity generators and obliged parties. Analogously, Langniss also identified that 
costs associated with negotiations were borne both by the electricity suppliers and the renewable 
electricity generators in the case of RPS in Texas. While, bidding and negotiation costs were also 
considered high in the study of Skytte et al. (2003) about the challenges for investments in 
renewable electricity projects in EU. Moreover, in the case of the UK FITs the importance of TCs 
related to the need of legal and technical experts to comply with grid interconnection requirements 
is low. On the other hand, Ram and Selvaraj (2012) in their study related to the barriers of RE 
entrepreneurs in India, mention that there is need of hiring legal and technical experts in order to 
understand and comply with grid interconnection requirements while the TCs associated with this 
fact are significant. This difference exists because in the case of UK electricity network there are 
uniform interconnection standards whilst in India there are not. As would be expected, except for 
the divergences there are also similarities between the results of this thesis and those of similar 
studies. Particularly, TCs related to approval and certification procedures were also identified in 
the case of the FIT scheme in the UK and were borne by the FIT Licensees. In this case, TCs 
were also associated with processes like calculations, billing and making payments. TCs also arose 
from administrative procedures as in the case study of the EU market for green electricity (Skytte 
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et al., 2003). Furthermore, the TCA of FITs also showed that obliged parties have to create 
compliance strategies due to regulation changes (e.g. due to tariff levels reductions FIT licensees 
have to calculate and make payments in accordance with the new information) as in the study of 
Skytte et al. (2003). 
4.2.3 TCs related to Monitoring 
If we compare the results of this analysis with ones of analogous studies, it becomes clear that 
there are several points where they come into an agreement. To begin with, the analysis of the UK 
FIT scheme identified TCs related to metering procedures as Langniss (2003) did in his study 
about the German EEG. Langniss (2003) identified monitoring costs as part of TCs which are 
borne by the regulator in the case of Texas RPS. In specific, monitoring costs arose from the 
approval and certification processes that the regulator had to monitor. However, in the case of the 
UK FIT scheme these costs are not only borne by the regulator (Ofgem) but also by the FIT 
licensees. Another identified similarity relates to the administrative costs and the additional costs 
that the obligated parties undertake in order to secure their compliance with the policy 
requirements. In particular, the analysis of the FIT scheme in the UK indicates that FIT licensees 
have to verify the generation and export meter readings in a regular basis to secure themselves 
from making FIT payments to ineligible installations. Additionally, sample reviews and random 
inspections in order to monitor the compliance of the obliged parties are also undertaken by the 
regulator (Ofgem) in the UK FIT scheme. At the same time, Oikonomou and Mundaca (2008) in 
their paper about the Tradable Green Certificate scheme in the Netherlands and in Sweden 
characterized TCs as “additional costs undertaken by obligated parties beyond costs of meeting the 
obligation itself”. Specifically in Sweden, the administrative costs were borne by electricity 
producers and suppliers who handled the RE quota obligation on behalf of end-users (Bergek & 
Jacobsson, 2010; Mundaca et al., 2013). Metering procedures and random quality checks are also 
characterized as sources of TCs under the German EEG (Langniss, 2003). Another point in 
commong is the fact that in both in the case of the German EEG (Langniss, 2003) and the UK 
FIT, the publication of reports about the performance of the schemes is defined as source of TCs 
borne by the authorities. 
Overall, in all the cases the search for and assessment of information, approval and certification 
procedures as well as administrative and metering processes were identified as sources of TCs. 
However, some divergences were acknowledged regarding the parties which borne these costs. In 
addition, a major difference between the results of similar studies and the current analysis consist 
the existence of negotiation costs and the TCs related to them. Consequently, what someone can 
conclude from the comparison above is that the nature of TCs under the UK FIT scheme is 
relatively consistent with those of other RE policy instruments. The existence of few divergences 
can be explained by the fact that each policy instrument has a different design form. According to 
Dijk et al. (2003), there might be divergences regarding the nature of TCs even between the same 
policy schemes since TCs are very much connected with the design form of a policy instrument 
and are not always directly linked to the selection of the instrument. 
4.3 Expert Views on the FIT Scheme 
In order to confront the findings of the first part of the analysis as well as the results from the 
comparison with similar studies mentioned in the previous sections, views from experts in the 
field were asked. In particular, three experts were interviewed and asked to express their opinion 
regarding the identified sources of TCs and if these costs were suitable for the case or not. 
Moreover, they were asked to comment on the similarities and differences being distinguished 
among the similar studies and to point out if there are additional TCs that should be included into 
the findings. A sample of the interview questions can be found in Appendix A. 
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The first interviewee was Dr. Ole Langniss who is senior consultant at Fichtner GmbH & Co KG 
in Germany. Besides this, he has examined the TCs related with the German FIT scheme and the 
Texas RPS at his Phd dissertation in 2003. According to Dr. Langniss there are search for 
information and consultation costs that the authorities bear during the preparation and planning of 
the FIT scheme. Moreover, he pointed out that source of TCs can be related to marketing 
activities for the promotion of the scheme. While setting the tariff levels is certainly a source of 
TCs according to him especially if different slots of tariffs for the different sizes of the systems 
need to be created. However, what determines if this preparation will be complicated or not, is the 
government’s experience on similar policy instruments. Specifically Dr. Langniss mentioned that if 
similar RET policy instruments are already implemented in the UK then the development of FIT 
baselines will be less complicated. Although, he mentioned that in democratic societies like the 
UK or Germany is a bit more time consuming to plan the FITs and to fix the tariff levels since 
more viewings and discussions with stakeholders are taking place compared to central economies 
like China. Regarding the nature of TCs during from the generator’s perspective, Dr. Langniss 
thinks that information costs can be describes as the main source of TCs. According to him, the 
potential generator has to search for information about the level of the tariffs, the registered 
energy suppliers, the application process, the payments etc. 
Moving to the implementation phase of the scheme, Dr Langniss agrees that is logical not to have 
negotiation costs under the UK FITs since the tariffs are fixed and there is a standards agreement 
between the FIT supplier and the RE generator. He adds that the in Texas the case is different 
since the contracts are individually adapted and people need to negotiate for the level of the tariff. 
Moreover, Dr. Langniss argues that during the implementation phase the FIT licensees bear most 
of the administrative costs and consequently most of the TCs. In particular he mentioned 
“Administrative costs consist a main source of TCs and it positive that part of them is included in 
the calculations of levelisation payments. The level of administrative costs that Ofgem recognizes 
sounds reasonable to me but I can not really judge it, it really depends on the process that the FIT 
licensees follow.” 
As regards the monitoring phase, he believes that there are many sources of TCs related to 
metering activities that both FIT licensees and the authorities have to undertake. “Monitoring 
activities are one of the main sources of TCs under FIT shemes like the German and the UK 
one.” he mentioned. 
Dr. Langniss thinks that for several reasons is justified that I have found different sources of TCs 
between similar studies or even for the same type of scheme. The different design of the schemes 
is one reason that can explain this, according to him. If different activities take place under a 
scheme then different cost will occur. In specific he mentioned “If you have a monthly monitoring 
cycle then obviously the costs will be higher compared with the case of an annual monitoring 
cycle. This is a detail on the design of the scheme but it really makes a difference.” Another reason 
he pointed out is the time period for which the scheme is being implemented. “If the scheme is 
new implemented (like in UK) then the different stakeholders are not so much experienced on 
administrating the programme. While when the scheme is already established the TCs become 
lower because of the economies of scale (like in Germany).” For Dr. Langniss is not right to make 
generalizations about TCs related to RET policies while is better to examine each case separately. 
Overall, he argues that the phases were the most significant and highest TCs occur are the 
implementation and monitoring while the actors who bear most of them are the FIT licensees and 
in a second place the authorities. The TCs borne by the generators are minor – otherwise people 
would not take part in the scheme anyway, according to him. Potential ways to front and decrease 
TCs is the standardization of implementation and monitoring activities. As an example Dr. 
Langniss mentioned the case of the German FIT where the government has standardized the data 
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collection process (e.g use of the same software) between the generatots and the FIT licensees as 
well as between the FIT licensees so it is clearer what everyone has to do and TCs are lower. 
In addition, Dr. Poul Erik Morthorst who is professor at the Department of Management 
Engineering in the Technical University of Copenhangen was interviewed. Dr. Morthorst 
mentioned that due diligence costs can be identified during the planning phase of the FITs both 
for the autority’s and generator’s perspective but the level of these costs is actually low. 
Concerning the nature of TCs during the implementation of the scheme, he agreed that there are 
no negotiation costs since payment levels are fixed by the law. However, he argued that 
administrative costs borne by the FIT suppliers are a significanr source of TCs. Besides this, 
metering costs and monitoring costs can be considered as an additional source of TCs under the 
FIT scheme. “Implementation and monitoring costs would be the highest cost under the UK 
FITs” he mentioned. Moreover, he described the monitoring phase as the “heaviest” part of the 
scheme from a TC perspective. As regards the fact that differences between the identified sources 
of TCs under similar studies, Dr. Morthorst comment that the nature of TCs depends on the 
design of a particular scheme and this can be different even between the same type of policy 
instrument. As an example he mentioned the FITs in Denmark where there is only one type of 
payment compared to UK and hence the monitoring activities are more simple. 
The third interviewee is Dr. Axel Michaelowa, head of research on International Climate Policy at 
the University of Zurich. His research focus is on market mechanisms in climate policy and the 
development of the future international climate policy regime. According to Dr. Michaelowa there 
are two perspectives from which the TCs of a RET policy can be examined: the political process 
and the single participant’s perspective. The first one includes TCs borne by the regulator during 
the preparation of the scheme. For the case of the UK FIT scheme, Dr. Michaelowa mentioned 
that “The UK Government has to design the instrument and this creates TCs. After that, there are 
other costs that the Government faces related to the set up of the rules, the regulations and the 
specification of the energy companies that have to take part.” Dr. Michaelowa argues that TCs that 
are generated during the design and set up of a policy instrument like the FITs in UK should be 
included into the analysis if a comprehensive assessment of TCs is requested. In order to identify 
the sources of these costs as well as estimate their magnitude questions like “How many officers 
did work on the drafting of the blueprint? How much time did Ofgem spend on stakeholder 
conferences or on the marketing of the scheme?” have to be posed. As regards the single 
participant’s perspective, TCs related to the search for information during the planning phase 
could be identified. Nevertheless, he believes that the TCs that borne by generators during the 
planning phase are not so significant. 
Concerning the implementation phase of the scheme, Dr. Michaelowa agrees that most of the 
administrative costs are borne by the FIT licensees. However, he thinks that TCs are borne by 
Ofgem since they also have to collect data regarding the payments been made. In addition, he 
agrees that since the tariff levels are set by the Government, negotiation costs can not be identified 
as sources of TCs in the UK FIT case. Furthermore, he mentioned that considering that FIT 
licensees are also required to participate in the complaint process in relation to generators’ 
compliance under the scheme there might be a source of TCs. Even so, it really depends on the 
amount of complaints that the FIT licensees have to deal with. So there might be cases where TCs 
are high if the FIT supplier has to hire an expert and cases where the dispute handling will be 
almost costless.  
His conclusion was that TCs associated with the preparation and designing of the FIT scheme are 
significant and should not be underestimated as well as the monitoring costs that the authorities 
bear during the operation of the scheme. In addition, he mentioned that TCs sources may differ 
among FITs schemes and that it is not suitable to make generalizations about TCs since each 
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policy instrument has a different design. In addition, he argued that trust is also an important 
factor since its absence can increase the level of due diligence and administrative costs or to create 
additional TCs. 
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5 Conclusions 
The opportunities related to the introduction of policy instruments such as FITs that aim at the 
diffusion of RET seem to be great however there are also barriers and issues that slow the RE 
deployment into modern economies. To overcome barriers to small-scale RET and to make the 
FIT scheme more cost-effective, transaction costs related to the application of FITs need to be 
analysed, better understood and eventually reduced.  
 
This study has identified three natures of TCs occurring during the life cycle phases of the UK 
FIT scheme: due diligence, approval and certification and monitoring. The life cycle phases of the 
scheme in which the costs were identified are i) planning, ii) implementation and iii) monitoring 
and verification. It was found that during the planning phase of the scheme most of the costs 
occurred were due diligence costs. TCs of due diligence arise in relation to search for and 
assessment of acquired information regarding the design and preparation of the scheme, 
consultations with other stakeholders, search for certified installation companies and preparation 
of the application for RE developers. In the implementation phase it was found that approval and 
certification costs were the main sources of TCs. Approval and certification costs arose in relation 
to application assessments, collection of data, administration of the scheme, calculation of FIT 
payments and paying activities. In the monitoring and verification phase, TCs occur in relation to 
monitoring. In specific, monitoring costs are associated with monitoring of the FIT licensees’ and 
the FIT generators’ compliance including random quality checks and hiring third parties for 
auditing, publishing annual reports and reviews and with managing of the levelisation process in a 
quarter and annual basis. As regards the actors which bear these costs the analysis found that the 
TCs arising in the planning phase are borne by the authorities (DECC) and the RE developers, 
while TCs arising in the implementation phase are typically born by the FIT licensees. Concerning 
the TCs occurring in the monitoring phase, these are borne by Ofgem and in a second place by the 
FIT licensees. In all, due diligence, administrative and metering costs identified as the main sources 
of TCs, while most of them occurred during the implementation and monitoring phases. When 
the findings of the UK FIT scheme compared with those of similar studies in the field it becomes 
clear that there are many similarities regarding the nature of the identified TCs. Nevertheless, in 
the case of the UK FIT scheme contract negotiations were not identified as a major source of TCs 
as in the other studies. In addition, the findings were confronted with the views of experts in the 
field. Experts confirmed the sources of TCs under the UK FITs and pointed out which are the 
most significant costs. According to them, the most significant TCs occur in the implementation 
and monitoring phases, while approval and certification costs as well as monitoring costs 
characterize the nature of the TCs borne mainly by the FIT licensees and Ofgem.  An important 
point that experts pointed out was that the required monitoring of the UK FIT scheme may be 
complicated and associated with higher costs since its baseline seem to be more complex 
compared to the German or the Danish. Furthermore, some of them suggested that the 
preparation and design of the scheme can be important sources of TCs that the authorities bear 
and should be considered under the TCA of the scheme. Nevertheless, the experts argued that the 
nature and the significance of TCs are very likely to differ even under FIT schemes because of a 
number of endogenous and/or exogenous factors. Main reasons are the different design forms of 
the schemes, the experience regarding the development of FITs, the maturity of the RET markets 
as well as the level of trust to authorities or to the involved actors. Since the sources of TCs are 
affected by several factors and are case specific it is not suitable to make generalizations about FIT 
schemes. Finally, examples of strategies that could front and potentially reduce TCs were identified 
such as the standardization of the data collection process done by the FIT licensees and of 
monitoring/auditing activities performed by both Ofgem and the FIT licensees. 
 
Overall, according to the statistics the UK FIT scheme can deliver the expected 1.6% of electricity 
from renewable sources by 2020. Nevertheless, if tariff degressions continue to be announced at 
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regular intervals, the TCs will probably be more evident as well as their impacts on the 
performance of the scheme. Therefore, the analysis of TCs and the search of ways that can 
confront them are necessary. The identification of the TCs’ nature under the UK FIT scheme it is 
the first step to understand which phases during the life cycle of the scheme TCs arise and who 
the actors that bear them the most are. Nevertheless, the estimation of their level will help to 
better understand the impacts of TCs on the scheme’s performance and to find the most suitable 
measures and strategies for reducing them. 
 
 
 
45 
Bibliography 
Arrow, K.J. (1969).The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Non-
market Allocation, in: The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PBB-System. Joint Economic Committee 
91/1(1). Government Printing Office. Washington DC 
Arvizu, D., T. Bruckner, H. Chum, O. Edenhofer, S. Estefen, A. Faaij, M. Fischedick, G. Hansen, G. Hiriart, O. 
Hohmeyer, K. G. T. Hollands, J. Huckerby, S. Kadner, A. Killingtveit, A. Kumar, A. Lewis, O. Lucon, P. Matschoss, 
L. Maurice, M. Mirza, C. Mitchell, W. Moomaw, J. Moreira, L. J. Nilsson, J. Nyboer, R. Pichs-Madruga, J. Sathaye, J. 
Sawin, R. Schaeffer, T. Schei,S. Schlomer, K. Seyboth, R. Sims, G. Sinden, Y. Sokona, C. von Stechow, J. Steckel, A. 
Verbruggen, R. Wiser, F. Yamba, T. Zwickel. (2011). Technical Summary. In IPCC Special Report on Renewable 
Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation [O. Edenhofer,R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, K. Seyboth, P. 
Matschoss, S. Kadner, T. Zwickel, P. Eickemeier, G. Hansen, S. Schlomer, C. von Stechow (eds)], Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
 
Battjes, J. J., Beeldman, M., Jansen, J. C., Corwn, P., Ormel, F. T., Schaeffer, G. J., . . . Sijm, J. P. M. (2000). 
Beleidsopties voor CO2-emissiereductie en de inzet van hernieuwbare energie in een geliberaliseerde energiemarkt 
[Policy options for CO2 emission reduction and the use of renewable energy in a liberalized energy market] (Report 
No. ECN-C-00-048). Petten: ECN. 
 
Bergek, A.,&Jacobsson, S. (2010). Are tradable green certificates a cost-efficient policy driving technical change or a 
rent-generating machine? Lessons from Sweden 2003–2008. Energy Policy, 38(3), 1255–1271. 
Bjorkqvist, O., & Wene, C. (1993). A study of transaction costs for energy investments in the residential sector. Paper 
presented at the eceee 1993 Summer Study, Stockholm. 
Cherrington, R., Goodship, V., Kirwan, K., & Longfield, A. (2013). The feed-in tariff in the UK: A case study focus 
on domestic photovoltaic systems. Renewable Energy, 50421-426. doi:10.1016/j.renene.2012.06.0 
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405. 
Coase, R. H. (1998). "The New Institutional Economics," American Economic Review, 88(2), pp. 72-74 
Commons, J. R. (1931). Institutional Economics. American Economic Review V. 21, No.4, pp. 648-657. 
Commons, J. R. (1934). “Institutional Economics. Its place in Political Economy”. New York. Macmillan. 
 
Cory, K., Couture T., Kreycik C. (2009). Feed-in Tariff Policy: Design, Implementation, and RPS Policy Interactions. 
NREL Report No. TP-6A2-45549. 23 pp. 
Couture, T., Cory, K., Kreycik C., Williams, E. (2010). APolicy maker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy Design. 
Technical Report NREL/TP-6A2-44849, July 2010. 
DECC, (2009a). The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan - National strategy for climate and energy. Available at  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100509134746/http://www.decc.gov.uk/Media/viewfile.ashx?FilePath
=White%20Papers/UK%20Low%20Carbon%20Transition%20Plan%20WP09/1_20090724153238_e_@@_lowcarb
ontransitionplan.pdf&filetype=4 
DECC, (2009b). The UK Renewable Energy Strategy. Available at http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/cm76/7686/7686.pdf  
DECC, (2009c). Feed-in tariffs scheme: consultation on Comprehensive Review Phase 1- tariffs for solar PV. 
Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/42831/3364-FiTs-
scheme-consultation-doc.pdf  
46 
DECC, (2009d). Feed-in Tariffs Government’s Response to the Summer 2009 Consultation. Available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121217150421/http://decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/consultations/renewab
le%20electricity%20financial%20incentives/1_20100204120204_e_@@_FiTsconsultationresponseandgovdecisions.p
df  
DECC, (2010). Impact Assessment of Feed-in Tariffs for Small-Scale, Low Carbon, Electricity Generation 
(URN10D/536). Available at 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/consultations/elec_financial/elec_financial.aspx  
DECC, (2011). Feed-in Tariffs Scheme: consultation on Comprehensive Review Phase 1- tariffs for solar PV. 
Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/42831/3364-FiTs-
scheme-consultation-doc.pdf   
DECC, (2012). Feed-in Tariffs Scheme: Government Response to Consultation on Comprehensive Review Phase 2B: 
Tariffs for non-PV technologies and scheme administration issues. Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/42917/5905-government-
response-to-consultation-on-comprehensi.pdf  
Del Río, P. (2007). Encouraging the implementation of small renewable electricity CDM projects: An economic 
analysis of different options. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 11(7), 1361–1387 
 
Dijk, A.L. van, et al. (2003). Renewable Energy Policies and Market Developments. ECN-C--03-029, pp. 56, Retrieved 
from www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2003/c03029.pdf.  
Dincer, I. (2000). Renewable energy and sustainable development: a crucial review. Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews 4:157–175. doi:10.1016/S1364-0321(99)00011-8 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2009/28/EC of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use 
of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and  
2003/30/EC [2009] OJ L140/16 
Dudek, D.J. and Wiener J.B. (1996). Joint Implementation, Transaction Costs, and Climate Change. 
ENV/EPOC/GEEI (96) 1/REV1, OECD, Paris. 
 
Energy Act 2008, Chapter 32. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/32/data.pdf  
Energy Saving Trust, (2013). Feed-in Tariffs scheme (FITs). Available at 
http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/Generating-energy/Getting-money-back/Feed-In-Tariffs-scheme-FITs 
Finon, D., & Perez, Y. (2007). The social efficiency of instruments of promotion of renewable energies: A transaction-
cost perspective. Ecological Economics, 62(1), 77-92. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2006.05.011 
Fouquet, D., & Johansson, T. B. (2008a). European renewable energy policy at crossroads—Focus on electricity 
support mechanisms. Energy Policy, 36(11), 4079–4092. 
Furubotn, eg Richter, R. (1991). The New Institutional Economics: A collection of Articles from the Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Tubingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1-32. 
GEA. (2012). Global Energy Assessment – Toward a Sustainable Future. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
Gipe, P. (2010). “Renewable Tariffs and Standard Offer Contracts in the United States,” Wind-Works Web site. 
Available at http://www.wind-works.org/FeedLaws/USA/USAList.html  
47 
Huber, R., Ruitenbeek, J. and Serôa da Motta, R. (1999). Market Based Instruments for Environmental Policymaking 
in Latin America and the Caribbean: Lessons from Eleven Countries. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 381, World 
Bank, Washington, DC. 
 
IEA (2008). Deploying Renewables: Principles for Effective Policies, ISBN 978-92-64-04220-9.  
 
IPCC. (2007). Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.[B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer (eds)]. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
IPCC. (2011). Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation. Prepared by Working Group 
III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [O. Edenhofer, R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, K. Seyboth, P. 
Matschoss, S. Kadner, T. Zwickel, P. Eickemeier, G. Hansen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow (eds)]. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1075 pp. 
 
Kåberger, T., Sterner, T., Zamanian, M.,&Ju¨rgensen, A. (2004). Economic efficiency of compulsory green electricity 
Quotas in Sweden. Energy & Environment, 15(4), 675–697.  
 
Kesicki, F., & Strachan, N. (2011). Marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves: Confronting theory and practice. 
Environmental Science & Policy, 14(8), 1195–1204. 
 
Kiss, B. (2013). Building Energy Efficiency - Policy, learning and technology change.Submitted. 
 
Klein, S., Frazier, Gary L., Roth Victor J. (1990). A Transaction Cost Analysis Model of Channel Integration in 
International Markets, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 27, No. 2  pp. 196-208  
 
Klein, Peter G. (1999). New Institutional Economics. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Northampton, MA: Edward 
Elgar, Vol. I, pp. 456-489. 
Klein, A., Pfluger, B., Held, A., Ragwitz, M. & Resch, G. (Fraunhofer ISI) (2008). Evaluation of Different Feed-in 
Tariff Design Options: Best Practice Paper for the International Feed-in Cooperation, 2nd Edition. Berlin, Germany: 
BMU. October 2008.  
Klein, A., et al. (2010). Evaluation of Different Feed-in Tariff Design Options - Best Practice Paper for the 
International Feed-In Cooperation. Retrieced from www.feed-in-cooperation.org/wDefault_7/download-
files/research/Best_practice_Paper_3rd_edition.pdf?WSESSIONID=0a01d44af63020f8f87afefc991d8dce.  
 
Langniss, O. (2003). Governance structures for promoting renewable energy sources. Lund: Department of 
Technology and Society Environmental and Energy Systems Studies, Lund University. 
Lof, R. M. (2009). Addressing market failures in the CDM: A funding-based approach. Carbon & Climate Law 
Review, 25, 25–30. 
Macher, J. T., & Richman, B. D. (2008). Transaction cost economics: An assessment of empirical research in the social 
sciences. Business and Politics, 10(1). doi: i10.2202/1469-3569.1210 
Matthews, R. O. (1986). The economics of institutions and the sources of growth. Economic Journal, 96(384), 903–
918. 
McCann, L., Colby, B.,William Easter, K., Kasterine, A., & Kuperan, K. V. (2005). Transaction cost measurement for 
evaluating environmental policies. Ecological Economics, 52, 527–542. 
Ménard, C. (2004). “Transaction Costs and Property Rights” Edited by Claude Ménard. The International Library of  
the New Institutional Economics. Volume 2. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Ménard, C. and M. Shirley, Eds. (2005). Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Dordrecht, Springer.  
 
48 
Mendonça, M. (2007). Feed-in Tariffs – Accelerating the Deployment of Renewable Energy. ISBN 9781844074662, 
Earthscan.London. 
Mendonça, M.; Jacobs, D.; Sovacool, B. (2009). Powering the Green Economy: The Feed-in Tariff Handbook. London: 
Earthscan. 
Mendonça, M. (2011). The UK Feed-in Tariff: A User Survey, Working Paper (Birbeck University of London, London). 
Retrieved from http://earthaction.typepad.com/files/uk-FiT-working-paper_final.pdf  
 
Michaelowa, A., Stronzik, M., Eckermann, F., & Hunt, A. (2003). Transaction costs of the Kyoto Mechanisms. 
Climate Policy, 3(3), 261–278. 
 
Miller, A. S. (2008). Financing the integration of climate change mitigation into development. Climate Policy, 
8(2),152–169. 
Mitchell, C., J. L. Sawin, G. R. Pokharel, D. Kammen, Z. Wang, S. Fifi ta, M. Jaccard, O. Langniss, H. Lucas, A. 
Nadai, R. Trujillo Blanco, E. Usher, A. Verbruggen, R. Wustenhagen, K. Yamaguchi. (2011). Policy, Financing and 
Implementation. In IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation [O. 
Edenhofer, R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, K. Seyboth, P. Matschoss, S. Kadner, T. Zwickel, P. Eickemeier, G. 
Hansen, S. Schlomer, C. von Stechow (eds)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New 
York, NY, USA. 
 
Moomaw, W., F. Yamba, M. Kamimoto, L. Maurice, J. Nyboer, K. Urama, T. Weir. (2011). Introduction. In IPCC 
Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation [O. Edenhofer, R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. 
Sokona, K. Seyboth, P. Matschoss, S. Kadner, T. Zwickel, P. Eickemeier, G. Hansen, S. Schlomer, C.von Stechow 
(eds)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
 
Mundaca, L., & Neij, L. (2006). Transaction costs of energy efficiency projects: A review of quantitative estimations. 
Report prepared under Work Package 3 of the EuroWhiteCert Project: The International Institute for Industrial 
Environmental Economics at Lund University. 
Mundaca, L. (2007). Transaction costs of Tradable White Certificate schemes: The Energy Efficiency Commitment as 
case study.    4340–4354. 
Mundaca, L., Mansoz, M., Neij, L., & Timilsina, G. (2013). Transaction costs analysis of low-carbon technologies. 
Climate Policy, DOI:10.1080/14693062.2013.781452 
Nagaoka, M. P. T. (2002). A comercialização da energia elétrica cogerada pelo setor sucroalcooleiro em regiões do 
Estado de São Paulo [The sale of electricity from cogeneration by the sugarcane sector in the São Paulo region] 
(Unpublished master’s thesis). São Paulo: Faculdade de Ciências Agronômicas Universidade Estadual Paulista Julio de 
Mesquita Filho. 
 
North, D. C. (1990). “Institutions and a Transaction-Cost Theory of  Exchange” in James E.Alt and Kenneth A. 
Shepsle (eds), “Perspectives on Positive Political Economy”, Chapter 7, Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 182-
94. In “Transaction Costs and Property Rights” Edited by Claude Ménard. The International Library of  the New 
Institutional Economics. Volume 2. Edward Elgar Publishing. Pages 135-149 
 
North, D.C. (1993).The New Institutional Economics and Development.Washington University, St Louis. Retrieved 
from http://www.deu.edu.tr/userweb/sedef.akgungor/Current%20topics%20in%20Turkish%20Economy/north.pdf 
 
OECD. (2002). Implementing domestic tradeable permits: Recent developments and future challenges. Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
 
OECD. (2011). “Recent OECD work on Climate Change” ,OECD, Paris, November 2011. 
OFGEM, 2010. Delivering a Successful GB Feed-in Tariff – An Ofgem Operational Perspective. Presentation by 
Keith Duncan, 25 October 2010. Available at 
http://www.google.gr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CDoQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2
Fwww.solar-trade.org.uk%2Fmedia%2F3.%2520FiTs%2520-%2520Operational%2520Perspectives%2520-
49 
%2520OFGEM.ppt&ei=9ZUQUpGfAY2WhQeq6oHADA&usg=AFQjCNEeSCrbYcjPOstXlvVS9C4K3XGmFw&
sig2=IMu3skKflQV22Uw3UVvHkQ&bvm=bv.50768961,d.ZG4 
OFGEM, 2011. Feed-in Tariff (FIT): Annual Report 2010-2011. Annual Report to Secretary of State for Energy and 
Climate Change. Avaiable at https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/58868/FiTs-annual-report-2010-
2011.pdf  
OFGEM, 2012. Feed-in Tariff (FIT): Annual Report 2011-2012. Annual Report to the Secretary of State for Energy 
and Climate Change. Avaiable at https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/58860/FiTs-annual-report-2011-
2012.pdf  
OFGEM, 2013a. Feed-in Tariff: Guidance for Licensed Electricity Suppliers (Version 5.1). Available at 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/82341/feed-tariff-guidance-licensed-electricity-suppliers-version-
5.1.pdf  
OFGEM, 2013b. Feed-in Tariff Payment Rate Table for Photovoltaic Eligible Installations for FIT Year 4 
(2013/2014). Available at http://www.FiTariffs.co.uk/library/regulation/1304_PV.pdf  
OFGEM, 2013c. Feed-in Tariff: Guidance for renewable installations (Version 5). Available at 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/58855/FiT-generator-guidance.pdf  
OFGEM, 2013d. Feed-in Tariff Update Quarterly Report Issue 12.  Available at https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-
publications/75735/feed-tariff-update-quarterly-report-issue-12.pdf  
Oikonomou, V., & Mundaca, L. (2008). Tradable white certificate schemes: What can we learn from tradable green 
certificate schemes? Energy Efficiency, 1(3), 211–232. 
Ostertag, K. (1999), Transaction costs of raising energy efficiency. Paper presented at the IEA InternationalWorkshop 
on Technologies to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Washington, DC. 
Ram, B. S.,&Selvaraj, M. (2012). Entrepreneurship in the environmentally friendly and economically sound renewable 
energy conversion system. WSEAS Transactions on Environment and Development, 1(8), 13–22. 
Richter, R. (2005). The New Institutional Economics - Its Start, Its Meaning , Its Prospects. The European Business 
Organization Law Review (EBOR), 6:2, 161 – 200 
Rutherford, M. (2001). Institutional Economics: Then and Now, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(3), pp. 185-90 (173-
194).  
Selten, R. (1990).  Bounded rationality. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146(4), 649-658. 
Skytte, K., Meibom, P., Uyterlinde, M. A., Lescot, D., Hoffmann, T., & del Rı´o, P. (2003). Challenges for investment 
in renewable electricity in the European Union (Background report in the ADMIRE REBUS project). Patten: Admire 
Rebus Project. 
 
Stavins, R. N. (1995). Transaction costs and tradeable permits. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 29(2), 133–148. 
Stavins, R. N. (2001). Experience with market based environmental policy instruments, Resources for the Future 
Discussion Paper 01-58. 
Stern, N. (2006). The Economics of Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (available at: 
http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/sternreview_index.cfm) (accessed on 
24 February 2007). 
50 
The Secretary of State, 2013. Feed-in Tariffs (FITs) Determinations. Available at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/91914/FITs_QFC_determination
_Feb_2013.pdf  
Toke, D. (2007). Making the UK Renewables Programme FITTER, London: World Future Council. Retrieved from 
http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Rob/WFC_RO_Consultation_Response.pdf   
UNFCCC.2007. Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries. Retrieved from 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/impacts.pdf  
UNEP. 2012. Feed-in Tariffs as a Policu Instrument for Promoting Renewable Energies and Green Economies in Developing Countries. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/documents/UNEP_FIT_Report_2012F.pdf  
Walker, S.L. (n.d). Can the GB feed-in tariff deliver the expected 2% of electricity from renewable sources?. Renewable 
Energy, 43383-388. doi:10.1016/j.renene.2011.12.023 
Williamson, O. (1993). Transaction cost economics and organization theory. Industrial and Corporate Change, 2(2), 107-
156. 
Williamson, O. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal 
Organization. 
Williamson, O. E. (1979). “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of  Contractual Relations”. Journal of  Law 
and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Oct., 1979), pp. 233-261. The University of  Chicago Press. 
 
Worrell, E., Ramesohl, S., & Boyd, G. (2004). Advances in energy forecasting models based on engineering 
economics. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 29, 345–381. 
 
 
  
51 
 
Interviews 
Duncan, Keith, 15th July 2013, Senior Manager of the Governance & Renewables Compliance 
Environmental Programs at Ofgem 
 
Dr. Langniss, Ole, 29th August 2013, Senior Consultant at Fichtner GmbH & Co KG, Germany 
 
Dr. Michaelowa, Axel, 9th September 2013, Head of research on International Climate Policy at the 
chair “Political Economy and Development”, University of Zurich 
 
Dr. Morthorst, Poul Erik, 5th September 2013, Professor at DTU Management Engineering, 
Technical University of Copenhagen 
 
Dr. Owen, Gillian, 8th July 2013, Senior Research Associate at the Energy Institute at UCL, 
Australia. Non-executive board member of the energy regulator, Ofgem (previous position) 
 
Dr. Toke, David, 8th July 2013, Reader in Energy Politics in the Department of Politics and 
International Relations in the University of Aberdeen - Key player in the campaign to establish 
feed-in tariffs for small renewable projects in the UK. 
 
 
Email Communication 
Bird, Jon, 1st August 2013, Head of Sustainability, Northern Powergrid Holdings Company 
 
Le Gros, Richard, 15th August 2013, Technical Development Adviser, Energy Networks 
Association 
52 
Appendix A: Sample Interview Questions for Experts 
After exposing the findings of my analysis and mentioning the identified similarities/differences 
with similar studies to the interviewees, the following questions were asked: 
 What is your opinion regarding the identified sources of TCs during the planning phase? 
Do you think that these costs are suitable for this case? Do you think is not suitable and 
why? 
 What is your opinion regarding the identified sources of TCs during the implementation 
phase? Do you think that these costs are suitable for this case? Do you think is not suitable 
and why? 
 Do you think that the administration – qualifying costs are sufficient for addressing the 
TCs that the energy suppliers face during the implementation phase? 
 What is your opinion regarding the identified sources of TCs during the monitoring phase? 
Do you think that these costs are suitable for this case? Do you think is not suitable and 
why? 
 What is your comment on the fact that TCs related to negotiations were not identified 
under the UK FIT scheme? 
 Do you think that it is reasonable similar studies in the field to identify different sources of 
TCs? How this can be explained? 
 From your point of you, which is the phase under which most of the TCs occur and which 
is the most significant source of TCs under the FITs? 
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Appendix B: Tables and Figures 
British Gas      
Ecotricity  
E.ON 
EDF Energy 
EnDCo  
F & S Energy Limited 
First:utility 
Flow Energy Limited 
Gilmond Consulting  
GDF SUEZ Energy UK 
Good EnergyGreen Energy 
iSupply Energy 
Neas Energy Limited 
Npower  
Opus Energy 
Reuben Power 
Scottish Power 
Smartest Energy  
SSE (encompassing Scottish Hydro, SWALEC, 
Southern Electric & Atlantic) 
Spark Energy 
Symbio Energy LLP    
Texas Retail Energy, LLC  
The Midcounties Cooperative Limited  
Total Gas & Power 
Tradelink  
UK Healthcare Corporation Limited 
Utility Warehouse 
Utilita  
UPL 
Figure B-1 List of Confirmed FIT Licensees - 1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014 
Source: Retrieved From Ofgem website 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/SUSTAINABILITY/ENVIRONMENT/FITS/RFITLS/Pages/rFiTls.aspx 
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Table B-1 Summary of solar PV tariffs for 2013 
Total installed 
capacity (kW) 
Generation tariff 
with eligibility date* 
or after 1 May 2013 
and before 1 July 
2013 
Generation tariff 
with eligibility date 
on or after 1 July 
2013 and before 1 
October 2013 
Lower tariff**  with 
eligibility date 1 May 
2013 – 1 October 
2013 
Export tariff for 
2013 
<4kW (new build 
and retroFiT)  
15.44p/kWh  14.90p/kWh  6.85p/kWh  4.64p/kWh 
>4-10kW  13.99p/kWh  13.50p/kWh  6.85p/kWh  4.64p/kWh 
>10-50kW  13.03p/kWh  12.57p/kWh  6.85p/kWh  4.64p/kWh 
stand-alone  6.85p/kWh  6.85p/kWh  6.85p/kWh  4.64p/kWh 
Source: Table based on information in EnergySavingTrust.org website 
http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/Generating-energy/Getting-money-back/Feed-In-Tariffs-scheme-FITs  
 
*The eligibility date is the date from which a generator is eligible to receive FITs payments. In 
most of the cases, this is the date when a FIT supplier receives a valid application for FITs. 
**The Lower tariff is applied in cases where the Energy Performance Certificate requirement is 
not met (i.e. EPC has a band D or higher). 
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Table B-2 Qualifying FIT Costs for FIT year 4 determined by the Secretary of the State 
Type of Licensee Qualifying FITs cost s per generator 
Large FIT Licensee New generator £10 
Ongoing generator £15 
Small FIT Licensee New generator £25 
Ongoing generator £30 
Source: The Secretary of State (2013) 
 
According to the “Determination by the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change” 
report (2013), the following determinations/clarifications were given in order to better 
understand the table above: 
1. “Large FIT Licensee” means a FIT Licensee which either: 
a. Supplies electricity to at least 125.000 domestic costumers; or 
b. together with its Affiliates (as defined in Schedule A to Standard Licence 
Condition 33) jointly supplies electricity to at least 125.000 domestic 
costumers as at 31 December 2012. 
2. “Small FIT Licensee” means a FIT Licensee which either: 
a. Supplies electricity to fewer than 125.000 domestic costumers; or 
b. together with its Affiliates (as defined in Schedule A to Standard Licence 
Condition 33) jointly supplies electricity to fewer than 125.000 domestic 
costumers as at 31 December 2012. 
3. “new generator costs” are determined to be the one-off costs incurred by a FIT 
licensee on the occasion when an accredited FIT installation is identified on the 
central FIT register as being an accredited FIT installation for the first time. 
4. “ongoing generator costs” are determined to be the costs which continue to be 
incurred by a FIT licensee in respect of an accredited FIT installation which remains 
identified on the central FIT register during the particular FIT year. 
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Figure B-2 Who does what under the FIT scheme 
Source: Ofgem E-Serve, 2012: “Feed-in Tariffs” Presentation by Keith Duncan, 19 November 2012 
(Permission for use in this thesis) 
 
Table B-3 Generation tariffs of 2011 and proposed ones for solar PV 
Band (kW) 2011 generation tariff  
(p/kWh) 
Proposed generation tariff 
(p/kWh) 
4 kW or less (new build) 37.8 21.0 
4 kW or less (retroFiT) 43.3 21.0 
>4-10kW 37.8 16.8 
>10-50kW 32.9 15.2 
>50-100kW 19 12.9 
>100-150kW 19 12.9 
>150-250kW 15 12.9 
>250kW-5MW 8.5 8.5 
Stand alone 8.5 8.5 
Source: DECC, 2011 
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Figure B-3 Regional illustration of installed capacity by technology (MW) 
Source: Ofgem (2013c) 
 
